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ABSTRACT 
 Rapidly changing technology and near-peer adversaries in the Great Power 
Competition are dramatically changing the battlefield of the future with artificial 
intelligence and autonomous systems emerging as major components in small unit 
maneuvers. The Hyper-Enabled Operator System (HEO) is designed to allow operators to 
interface with autonomous systems without increasing users' cognitive load in order to 
achieve successful manned-unmanned interactions that increase survivability and 
lethality of operators. For HEO to succeed, however, it is essential that all technical 
components coalesce around a strong human machine interface (HMI) and that 
architecture for sensors, weapons, computing, and radio systems are designed for human 
operators in actual use cases. The goal of this capstone project is to emphasize the 
importance of HMI-centered design as a key pillar of the HEO system and to caution 
against implementing technology without thoroughly considering how it will be used by 
operators in actual war-fighting situations. Too much focus on developing HEO 
technology without sufficient attention to how such innovative technology will be 
adopted by the end-user creates a gap in technical capacity and human capabilities that 
can lead to cognitive overload for users and wasted development and procurement 
resources. 
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I. THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE 
The operator’s role on the battlefield of the future will be profoundly different than 
it is today. Rapidly changing, powerful technology means more unmanned systems under 
operator control will be the first through a breach, and sensors will translate radio traffic 
into 3D audio headphone feeds to provide precise positional data.1 Near-peer adversaries 
in the Great Power Competition will also have similar technologies and the training to 
leverage them effectively. The U.S. military advantage will rely on its doctrinal and 
organizational integration of Artificial Intelligence and automated systems technology into 
the wider conventional and allied forces and across multiple domains to capitalize on the 
vast networks of collected information.2 To prevent cognitive overload from burdening the 
end user, the military must ensure that the data is understandable, visible and most 
importantly linked in a reliable and intuitive human machine interface (HMI). Adopting 
early integration with artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, tailoring user 
interface design, and conducting appropriate training will build operators’ trust in the 
salience of information the systems provide.3 
A. THE HYPER-ENABLED OPERATOR 
The Hyper-Enabled Operator (HEO) system is designed to allow operators to 
interface with autonomous systems without increasing the user’s cognitive load in order to 
achieve successful manned-unmanned interactions to increase survivability and lethality 
of operators.4 The goal of the HEO is to ensure the right information is given to the right 
                                                 
1 Ala Al-Fuqaha, Mohsen Guizani, Mehdi Mohammadi, Mohammed Aledhari, and Moussa Ayyash, 
“Internet of Things: A Survey on Enabling Technologies, Protocols, and Applications,” IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17, no. 4 (2015): 2347–2376. 
2 Scott Flanick, Andrew Davidson, Ashley Yoo, John David Mote, and Vikram Mittal, “Expanding the 
Hyper-Enabled Operator Technology across the Special Forces Enterprise,” Industrial and Systems 
Engineering Review 7, no. 1 (May 2019): 2–8. 
3 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, 1971),181. 
4 Flanick et al., “Expanding the Hyper-Enabled Operator,” 2–8. 
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person at the right time in order to ensure they can be more effective.5 The HEO concept 
evolved from the now discontinued Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) 
project—a powered-armored exoskeleton suit that uses augmented reality situational 
awareness for the operator.6 HEO abandoned the exoskeleton concept and instead 
integrated robust sensing, processing, and augmented reality technology that empowers 
operators across an array of mission types from counter-terrorism to mobility operations.7  
B. PROJECT GOAL 
The goal of this capstone is to highlight the importance of Human Machine 
Interface-centered design as a key pillar of the HEO system and to ensure organizational 
changes allow for operators proper training to build trust and proficiency with artificial 
intelligence (AI) and unmanned autonomous systems (UASs). For the hyper-enabled 
operator concept to succeed, it is essential that all technical components coalesce around a 
strong human machine interface (HMI) architecture which links all sensor inputs, weapons, 
and radio systems with seamless computing to provide the human operator maximum 
situational awareness while reducing their cognitive overload. Additionally, identifying 
cognitive overload through performance and neuro-physiological data to raise the 
operators’ cognitive advantage, and then individually adjusting training, is the beginning 
to creating organizational changes which will optimize the individual’s impact on the 
battlefield.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The HEO systems are not properly designed to consider the human cognitive 
limitations and the optimal design features to optimize the human’s tasks and decision-
making abilities.8 This creates a gap in technical capacity and human capabilities that can 
                                                 
5 Flanick et al., 2–8. 
6 Flanick et al., 2–8. 
7 Flanick et al., 2–8. 
8 Julie Adams, “Cognitive Task Analysis for Unmanned Aerial System Design,”  Handbook of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, edited by Kimon P. Valavanis and George J. Vachtsevanos, 2425–41. 
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. 
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lead to cognitive overload for users and wasted development and procurement resources. 
This N aims to fill this gap by focusing on the unique needs of Artificial Intelligence for 
Small Unit Maneuvers (AISUM) and the challenges of innovation adoption.  
D. AREAS OF RESEARCH 
This report examines the importance of Human Machine Interface-centered design 
through six critical lenses: 
• The major elements that define HEO 
• The specific needs of AISUM 
• The nature of Cognitive Load in Neuroscience  
• The crucial elements of good User Experience and User Interface (UX/UI) 
• The analysis of human behavior and interaction through Sociotechnical 
Systems (STS) 
• The challenges and opportunities of Innovation Adoption  




Figure 1. Project Visualization 
E. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
HEO leverages HMI to provide operators with actionable intelligence and precise 
information by integrating sensing technology, algorithm and processing technology, 
communications technology, and system level technology.9 These technical requirements 
in turn drive enabling technologies—applied innovations that foster rapid and radical 
change in user capabilities.10 
As AI SUM conducts more robust tasking, the human’s ability to control the 
machines must become increasingly more reliant on robust autonomy and artificial 
intelligence to reduce the cognitive burden and the team size required to operate the 
machines.11 
                                                 
9 Al-Fuqaha et al., “Internet of Things: A Survey on Enabling Technologies, Protocols, and 
Applications,” 2347–2376. 
10 Mick Ryan, Man-machine Teaming for Future Ground Forces (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018), 26. 
11 Adams, “Cognitive Task Analysis for Unmanned Aerial System Design,” 2426. 
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Managing cognitive load through proper training with artificial intelligence-
enabled automated systems will help operators gain trust in their systems. Additionally, 
cognitive measurement tools should be used during training to identify and then remedy 
situations which cognitively overload an individual. Training to each specific situation 
should be individualized based on the operator’s strengths and weaknesses identified 
during this advanced method of instruction. For example, the importance of the data 
provided to the operator can be adjusted through auditory, visual, tactile, and kinesthetic 
methods to prevent cognitively overloading the individual. And finally, improving the 
Human Machine Interface design through tailored systems based on individual cognitive 
assessments will help each individual perceive and receive information scaled to their 
innate strengths and weaknesses.12  
UX/UI Design is a crucial lynchpin in a Human-Machine Team; cumbersome 
user interface removes the operator from the battlefield while reducing the drone swarm 
utility. To improve innovation adoption, user interface/user experience must be highlighted 
and emphasized throughout development. 
Sociotechnical System Thinking finds that effective jobs and workflows are those 
that consider this interaction of technical and human needs by balancing the operator’s 
intrinsic needs with the operation’s need for technical efficiency.13  
Innovation adoption involves independent variables on the individual and 
collective levels, including the characteristics of leaders in the organization, characteristics 
of the internal structure, and external characteristics of the organization.14 The size and 
complexity of the DOD’s mission and systems creates friction and latency into decision-
                                                 
12 JJ Walcutt, Cort Horton, Dhiraj Jeyanandarajan, Walt Yates. “Neuro-Optimization for Accelerated 
Learning Pace and Elevated Comprehension: Military Applications,” 2020, 14. 
13 Richard Daft, Organization Theory and Design,12th ed. (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2016), 462. 
14 Ismail Sahin, “Detailed Review of Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations Theory and Educational 
Technology-Related Studies Based on Rogers’ Theory,” Turkish Online Journal of Educational 
Technology-TOJET 5, no. 2 (2006): 14–23 
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making, adding additional layers of required coordination, rules, regulations and other 
mechanisms that inherently hinder the pace innovation.15 
F. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
• USSOCOM’s concept of the HEO and NSW’s AISUM must optimize the 
UX/UI in order to mitigate cognitive and information overload.  
• This requires not just developing the technology to completion but 
ensuring SOCOM and its subordinate commands implement the right 
innovation adoption and sociotechnical approach in order to successfully 
realize the concept of the HEO. 
• Failure to account for human user in major weapon systems programs 
leads to serious issues impacting operator survivability not to mention 
unnecessary redesigns, delays, and additional financial cost. 
• The Special Operations Forces Community must prioritize early training 
with Artificial Intelligence and automated systems to build the operators’ 
trust in the salience of information provided so the operators can decrease 
the cognitive effort required to monitor the unmanned systems.16  
• The military should invest in neuro-physiologic measuring devices which 
can identify and quantify real-time cognitive overload in a dynamic, Full 
Mission Profile (FMP) scenario to mitigate the detrimental effects of 
cognitive overload on operators in combat.  
• Refocus the Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) to emphasize 
the importance of wearable technology to achieve individual Neural 
                                                 
15 U.S. House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(Statement of Dr. Eric Schmidt), 1. 
16 Mica R. Endsley, “From Here to Autonomy: Lessons Learned From Human–Automation 
Research,” Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 59, no. 1 
(February 2017): 8, https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720816681350. 
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Fitness—or the balance of cognitive, emotional, and physical fitness.17 As 
the Preservation of the Force and Families initiative in the military 
continues, continuous physical and mental health monitoring using data 
collected from emerging wearable devices should be invested in and 
become a daily part of the individual health and neural fitness.  
  
                                                 
17 Andrew Huberman and Sam Golden, “Biomechanical Acoustic Devices and Measuring Biologic 
Signals,” (Zoom lecture, Stanford University, CA and Northwestern University, MI, August 5, 2020). 
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APPENDIX A. HYPER ENABLED OPERATOR 
Ten years from now, if the first thing going through the door after a breach 
is not an unmanned system, then shame on us. And if there are not more 
unmanned systems than U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground units, shame 
on us. 
—Robert Work, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly states that a primary task for the 
military is to seek new capabilities that create clear advantages for our service members. 
This includes eliminating bureaucratic impediments to innovation while embracing less 
expensive and time-sensitive commercial off-the-shelf solutions to field enhanced 
capabilities that can be easily upgraded as new technologies come online.18 Throughout 
the current battlefield Naval Special Warfare (NSW) has successfully utilized unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS) to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in 
support of combat operations. In support of the guidance put forth by the president NSW 
has made it a top priority to develop and improve AI-enabled robotics in support of Small 
Unit Maneuver (SUM) in order to enhance combat effectiveness and situational awareness.  
In 2010, the Department of Defense restated autonomy as the single greatest theme 
for today’s unmanned systems. Barry Scott defines autonomous warfare as, “an operational 
concept that exploits the advantages of unmanned, autonomous, and robotic systems to 
increase autonomy and freedom for the human warfighter.” 19 Paul Scharre reiterates this 
point in his article, “Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm,” when he 
explains that emerging robotic technologies such as uninhabited systems will enable future 
special operators to fight as a swarm, with increased combat power, highly coordinated 
                                                 
18 White House, National Security Strategy  (Washington, DC: White House, 2017),  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, 28. 
19 Barry S. Scott, “Strategy in the Robotic Age: A Case for Autonomous Warfare” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 3. 
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networking, and the ability to speed up the decision making loop on the battlefield.20 The 
introduction of this swarm technology is the first step in the human-machine teaming that 
will change the way wars are fought in the future. 
As of 2015, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) was leading autonomous drone 
swarm technology implementation. NPS’s Advanced Robotic Systems Engineering 
Laboratory (ARSENL) set a record by flying 50 commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
autonomous drones simultaneously.21 In 2000, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt co-wrote 
a revolutionary publication, Swarming & the Future of Conflict, which originated the 
concept of swarming in the 21st century. The underlying theme of this publication identifies 
the fourth basic form of warfare, “swarming.”22 Scharre describes swarming as a network 
of uninhabited vehicles that autonomously coordinated their actions to accomplish a task 
under some degree of mission-level human direction.23 There has never been a better time 
for institutions like NPS and war colleges across the country to take the lead on research 
and development of emerging technology in the field of Robotic Autonomous Systems 
(RAS). 
The application of this style of warfare requires, as noted by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
“building a fully integrated surveillance and communication system in support of swarm 
forces, a highly sophisticated command-and-control structure, and doctrinal innovation.” 
24 The concept of Artificial Intelligence for Small Unit Maneuver (AISUM) is Naval 
Special Warfare’s vision for the future of tactical maneuver elements teamed with 
intelligent adaptive systems. In the future multi-domain environment, the adversary will 
attempt to contest all domains through cutting off key communications and navigation 
                                                 
20 Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm (Washington, DC: Center for 
a New American Security, 2014), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06405. 
21 Timothy H. Chung et al., “Live-Fly, Large-Scale Field Experimentation for Large Numbers of 
Fixed-Wing UAVs,” in 2016 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA) 
(Washington, DC: IEEE,  2016), 1255–62, https://doi.org/10.1109/ICRA.2016.7487257. 
22 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Swarming & the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2000). 
23 Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield, 11–12. 
24 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Swarming & the Future,” 46. 
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bands of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The adversary’s ability to leverage complex 
and congested terrain will lead to a decrease in joint force capabilities and reduce 
effectiveness of SOF maneuver elements. It is essential that Naval Special Warfare 
leverage the advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to 
revolutionize human-machine teaming. The continued experimentation and research in 
theory and technology that supports robotic autonomous systems (RAS), miniaturized 
sensors, and secure autonomous communications networks will decrease the cognitive load 
on the operators and will prove to be a force multiplier in small unit maneuver warfare; 
however, if we don’t begin to foster a culture of innovation within the SOF organization 
while teaming up with private industry we will quickly fall behind our adversaries in this 
era of Great Power Competition. 
In 2019, a capstone team from the Naval Postgraduate School recognized the 
DOD’s inability to innovate was related to a lack of education and identified the need for 
a curriculum that can bring together stakeholders, students, and private industry to create 
innovative solutions. This became the driving force behind 697’s Applied Design for 
Innovation. The goal of the 697 curriculum is to provide solutions to real world problems 
and deliver leaders with a comprehensive understanding of the innovation process back to 
the force.25  
This appendix will highlight how hands-on work with stakeholders, cross-campus 
collaboration, external partnership, and deliverable products are the four pillars in which 
future capstone teams will use to advance their lines of effort. Fostering relationships with 
private industry to advance capabilities and integrate Robotic Autonomous System’s will 
prove vital to developing the AISUM concept and moving one step closer to the hyper-
enabled operator. 
                                                 
25 Leo Blanken, “Solving Wicked Problems: 697 Applied Design for Innovation.” (Class lecture, 
Naval Postgraduate School, April 14, 2020) 
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B. HYPER-ENABLED OPERATOR SYSTEM  
Human-machine interaction (HMI) is an interdisciplinary design science that 
combines knowledge and methods from professional fields including psychology, 
sociology, computer science, instruction and graphic design, human factors and 
ergonomics.26 HMI is at the heart of our experiences with the technology that facilitates 
routine processes that range from checking our account balance to operating heavy 
machinery, providing decision support in everything from professional fields to driving 
directions, delivering education and training, and providing a platform and content 
structure for leisure, culture, and community interaction. The goal of HMI is to improve 
the quality of life for users on both the individual and community level, and to this end its 
central concern is usability.  
The U.S. Military Standard for Human Engineering Design Criteria defines four 
high level goals for usability that relate to HMI:  
1. Achieve required performance by operator, control and maintenance.  
2. Minimize skill and personnel requirements and training time.  
3. Achieve required reliability of personnel-equipment combinations.  
4. Foster design standardization within and among systems.27  
Each goal is predicated on limiting cognitive load for operators, load which has 
always been the limiting factor in such interactions and remains the North Star for 
designing autonomous systems for defense capabilities.  
The hyper-enabled operator system, or HEO, is, at a high level, a system designed 
to allow operators to interface with autonomous systems without increasing the user’s 
cognitive load in order to achieve successful manned-unmanned interactions to increase 
                                                 
26 Ben Shneiderman, Catherine Plaisant, Maxine Cohen, Steven Jacobs, Niklas Elmqvist, and 
Nicholas Diakopoulos, Designing the User Interface: Strategies for Effective Human-Computer 
Interaction, 6th ed. (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2016), 37–38. 
27 Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities, Document 
MIL-STD-1472D, Notice 3 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 1989), 11. 
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survivability and lethality of operators.28 Originally designed to protect operators who are 
the first through a door in a rescue mission or hostage situation, the scale and expense of 
the system requires it to be expanded to support a range of missions across United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) ranging from transport to combat to medical. 
In essence, the goal of the HEO is to ensure the right information is given to the right 
person at the right time in order to ensure they can be more effective.29 By managing task 
load across units, the HEO manages cognitive load for each individual. To achieve this, 
the HEO leverages HMI to provide operators with actionable intelligence and precise 
information by integrating sensing technology, algorithm and processing technology, 
communications technology, and system level technology. These technical requirements 
in turn drive enabling technologies –applied innovations that foster rapid and radical 
change in user capabilities.30 
C. HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACES (HMI) 
The interfaces operators engage with to receive information and mission critical 
support must be intuitive in that they deliver data in a way humans naturally receive and 
process it; they must also be highly flexible such that they can be modified in accordance 
to evolving human needs and contexts. The presentation of information to users must not 
interfere with their critical perceptual tasks or battlefield operations.31  
The quality and usability of human machine interfaces is a key pillar in the HEO 
system and the operator’s ability to interact and control smart autonomous systems in the 
HEO context.32 Innovative technology and design principles are being applied to make 
                                                 
28 Flanick et al., “Expanding the Hyper-Enabled Operator,” 2–8. 
29 Ryan, “Man-machine Teaming for Future Ground Forces,” 21. 
30 Ala Al-Fuqaha, Mohsen Guizani, Mehdi Mohammadi, Mohammed Aledhari, and Moussa Ayyash, 
“Internet of Things: A Survey on Enabling Technologies, Protocols, and Applications,” IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17, no. 4 (2015): 2347–2376. 
31 Alex MacCalman et al., “The Hyper-Enabled Operator | Small Wars Journal,” Small Wars Journal, 
June 6, 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hyper-enabled-operator, 7. 
32 Walcutt et al., “Neuro-Optimization for Accelerated Learning Pace and Elevated Comprehension: 
Military Applications,” 2020, 14. 
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interfaces more natural and usable. These include using 3D audio systems rather than 
traditional non-directional headphone audio so that different actors and radio traffic 
elements can be delivered from identifiable positions in a 3D landscape; haptic feedback 
can be used to deliver spatially significant alerts and data, reducing cognitive load while 
maintaining situational awareness.33 
Control mechanisms are also evolving beyond the typical tactile, button or pixel-
based interface with voice and gesture control taking a more prominent role that allows 
operators to keep hands free for other tasks. Augmented reality enables maps and data feeds 
to be arbitrarily displayed in the operator’s field of view whether in a headset or spatial 
projection; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance feeds can be displayed in ways 
that are customizable and can be activated and deactivate on demand with voice and gesture 
controls.34  
Human-Machine Interface is nested within the HEO System Boundary which 
further categorizes the system features into necessary and enabling elements, such as 
foundational infrastructure like data management and analytics, and related capability 
areas, such as biotechnologies like human performance optimization (Figure 2).35  
                                                 
33 Walcutt et al., “Neuro-Optimization for Accelerated Learning Pace and Elevated Comprehension: 
Military Applications,”14. 
34 Walcutt et al., 14. 
35 Al-Fuqaha et al., “Internet of Things: A Survey on Enabling Technologies, Protocols, and 
Applications,” 2347–2376. 




Figure 2. HEO System Boundary 
D. SENSORS 
Sensing technologies focus on collecting threat information using sensory data 
processing tools such cameras for both visible and non-visible spectrum imaging, 
microphones, antennae, and cyber signature detection. Sensing leverages a range of 
enabling technologies, including MEMS, distributed sensing, adaptive / flexible sensors, 
and underwater sensors.  
Microelectromechanical Systems, or MEMS, combine electrical and mechanical 
components on an integrated microchip in order to perform a broad range of sensory tasks 
such as motion detection and sound detection using gyroscopes, accelerometers, and other 
technology.36 MEMS technology is a fundamental part of military navigation, 
communication, and optical systems, integrating with other core technologies like Lidar.37 
MEMS bio-sensing capabilities expand into water toxicity testing6 and other novel field 
applications.  
Distributed sensing is a network-centric approach to sensory processing and 
situation assessment that leverages a hierarchy of capabilities, information, and control 
                                                 
36 Paul B Ruffin and Sherrie J. Burgett, “Recent Progress in MEMS Technology Development for 
Military Applications,” Proc. SPIE 4334 In Smart Structures and Materials 2001: Smart Electronics and 
MEMS: (August 2001), 1–2. 
37 Xiaobao Lee, Chunhui Wang, Zhaoxu Luo, and Shengqing Li, “Optical Design of A New Folding 
Scanning System in MEMS-Based Lidar.” Optics & Laser Technology 125 (2020): 106013, 1. 
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nodes.38 Distributed sensing can collect higher quality information by combining different 
spatial perspectives, different sensing modalities, and higher density deployment to create 
a fuller picture of the available data.  
Flexible sensors are lightweight, wearable, and often designed for biological 
integration, or so-called electronic skin; constructed of deformable substrates like 
polycarbonate (PC) or polyethylene terephthalate (PET), polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) or 
silicone rubbers, they are designed for pliancy, stretchability, and transparency.39 These 
sensors use electrical properties such as triboelectricity, capacitance, or piezoelectricity of 
solid nanomaterials or metallic liquids to detect pressure, temperature, torsion, strain, 
humidity and other physical data.40 
Using the lowest power wireless communication and networking capability 
available, piezo-acoustic backscatter (PAB) technology allows for battery-free or 
extremely low power underwater sensing of data such as temperature, acidity, or toxicity.41 
Similarly, by leveraging the piezoelectric electric effect, underwater sensors detect the 
vibrations of waves and reflect signals back to receivers in a binary system alternating 
between wave and no wave to transmit data and harvest energy.42 
E. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES 
The HEO system uses a blend of enabling technologies to collect and analyze data 
in order to generate actionable intelligence. Artificial intelligence is leveraged to increase 
system autonomy and situational awareness and reduce operator requirements, while 
                                                 
38 Henry Leung, Sandeep Chandana, and Shuang Wei, “Distributed Sensing Based on Intelligent 
Sensor Networks,” IEEE Circuits and Systems Magazine 8, no. 2 (2008): 38–52. 
39 Joo Chuan Yeo and Chwee Teck Lim, “Emerging Flexible and Wearable Physical Sensing 
Platforms for Healthcare and Biomedical Applications.” Microsystems & Nanoengineering 2, no. 1 (2016): 
1–19. 
40 Leung et al., “Distributed Sensing,” 38–52.  
41 Junsu Jang and Fadel Adib, “Underwater Backscatter Networking,” In Proceedings of the ACM 
Special Interest Group on Data Communication, (2019): 187–199.  
42 Rob Matheson, “A Battery-Free Sensor for Underwater Exploration,” MIT News, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, accessed September 7, 2020, https://news.mit.edu/2019/battery-free-sensor-
underwater-exploration-0820. 
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machine learning allows the system to communicate equipment or navigational issues or 
errors for operator action. Computer vision applies artificial intelligence and deep learning 
technology for image identification and classification, with applications for threat 
assessment and situational awareness that enhances decision making, removes blind spots, 
and provides navigational guidance.  
Computational processing technology serves to reduce the Observe-Orient-Decide-
Act (OODA) loop timing interval by leveraging distributing processing and edge 
computing so that data and computation functions are as close to the decision point as 
possible, saving bandwidth and improving response times.43 The flow and integrity of 
information between stages in the OODA loop is essential, and the system incorporates 
non-standard encryption technology and novel frequencies.44 This paradigm extends to the 
overall communication system that incorporates adaptive/resilient networks focused on 
expanded autonomous networking in order to transform static networks into dynamic 
ones.45 
On a procedural level, the HEO uses algorithms for key functions that include 
change detection, behavioral modeling, tracking, 3D mapping, GPS-denied navigation, 
biometrics, and image fusion.46 On a system level, HEO technologies provide tactical 
weaponry for air, naval, and land and protection with lightweight armor and signature 
management.  
F. APPLICATIONS 
HMI allows for new display and visualization paradigms such as augmented reality, 
transparent displays to provide useful data that improves situational awareness while 
                                                 
43Mahadev Satyanarayanan, “The Emergence of Edge Computing.” Computer 50, no. 1 (2017): 30–
39. 
44 Kennedy Harrison, Josh White, Paul Rivera, Tyler Giovinco, Jaritzel Jurado, and Vikram Mittal, 
“Aligning Needs, Technologies, and Resources for Special Operations,” In The Proceedings of the Annual 
General Donald R. Keith Memorial Conference, (Department of Systems Engineering United States 
Military Academy, 2019), 113–118. 
45 Matheson, “A Battery-Free Sensor for Underwater Exploration.” 
46 Flanick et al., “Expanding the Hyper-Enabled Operator,” 2–8. 
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reducing cognitive load.47 HMI also enables new automation and operating concepts that 
can be realized with the HEO, such as swarm optimization with the operator controlling 
self-organizing robot swarms and remotely controlled fully autonomous robot platforms in 
conflict situations.48 Medics can use the technology to combine bio sensing with 
augmented reality for proximally contextualized guidance and remote communications for 
telemedicine support from surgical experts.49 Air controllers can leverage transparent and 
augmented reality displays to manage information such as proximity of supporting 
resources that are currently only tracked by radio communication; this would significantly 
reduce cognitive loads and improve operator lethality.50 
G. CONCLUSION 
Successful HMI centers on translating human goals into explicit instructions 
computers can follow while translating the machine’s decision space into a context the 
operator can understand and control through visual, aural and tactile feedback.51 As a 
system, the HEO needs to increase operator survivability and lethality across a variety of 
functions and roles, including joint terminal air controllers, intelligence officers, vehicle 
drivers and mission sets as diverse as counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, covert 
operations, and direct action. Solving the HMI challenge while serving all stakeholders, 
requires clear conceptual planning, innovative thinking, and partnering with private 
industry to develop cutting edge technology. The Autonodyne project has focused on 
establishing a process which can serve as a model for future capstone endeavors and a 
foundation for further research towards the actualization of AISUM in an HEO system.  
                                                 
47 Flanick et al., 2–8 
48 Ryan, “Man-machine Teaming for Future Ground Forces.”  
49 Flanick et al., “Expanding the Hyper-Enabled Operator,” 2–8  
50 Flanick et al., 2–8 
51 Andrew Ilachinski, “AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies,” CNA 
Corporation, (2017), 106. 
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H. AUTONODYNE SUMMARY REPORT 
1. Purpose  
There is a need for RAS’s C2 and HMT Interface to allow a single operator or a 
team of operators to control multiple dissimilar platforms without Cognitive Overload. 
NSW currently operates a multitude of unmanned systems that all have completely 
different ground control stations, operating functions, displays and User Interfaces (UI). 
Non-intuitive and complex user interfaces are a common problem when incorporating new 
systems. This adds additional complexity for operators who must be trained on multiple 
systems but may not be a subject matter expert in unmanned systems. This adds training 
requirements and learning time for operators that is already limited.  
2. Key Stakeholders 
• Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) has performed its own 
experimentation and development work integrating the DJI Mavic and 
linking ATAK with the Autonodyne CCS. AFSOC has supplied the 
endorsement Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) supporting this 
Phase II SBIR. 
• Separately, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) has partnered with Autonodyne 
since FY18 to develop a Common Control Station (CSS) for small 
Unmanned Vehicles (UxV), sponsored by DOD’s Rapid Reaction 
Technology Office (RRTO). 
• Naval Postgraduate School in coordination with NSW. SOCOM EOTACS 
is currently evaluating for sUAS Program of Record 
3. Autonodyne LLC 
Autonodyne is a 2014 spinoff from commercial avionics company Avidyne, a 
provider of full-suite aviation technology. The initial efforts involved adapting Avidyne’s 
manned avionics systems and software for high-performance DOD unmanned combat 
aerial systems (UCAS), and optionally piloted (OPV) civil aircraft. The Autonodyne 
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CEO/Co-founder had been leading the engineering efforts at Avidyne and was able to 
leverage his experience and contacts as an Air Force attack/test pilot to optimize the 
technology for DOD use cases. 
Autonomy is at the core of all systems developed with the mindset of utilizing 
multiple Robotic Autonomous Systems (RAS) to accomplish missions in a complex and 
contested environment. In the current Period of Performance (PoP) the company is 
leveraging and enhancing existing capabilities to allow for full-mission swarming. 
Autonodyne makes it a priority to use open-system architecture which allows for 
modularity. The use of open standards for data ingest, storage as well as for training, and 
transfer of AI models such as neural networks is a key component to working with the 
Department of Defense (DOD).  
4. History 
By 2017, Autonodyne began optimizing this technology suite for sUAS platforms, 
emphasizing the synergy between advanced human-machine interfaces (HMI) and 
autonomy behaviors and applying that to multi-vehicle, multi-domain operations with the 
goal of using on-board semantic reasoning to develop contextual awareness so the group 
of UxS platforms serve as a human force multiplier.  
In 2018 and 2019, Autonodyne was able to secure a range of customers/partners to 
help fund development of this technology to include state and federal law enforcement, 
state and federal emergency response organizations, and DOD with focus on drone package 
delivery, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) applications. 
DOD’s Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) and JSOC-X funded 9 months 
of development in late 2018 and first half of 2019 that resulted in a baseline sUAS control 
application capable of simultaneously controlling up to 9 UxS devices and became the 
basis of the current development efforts. 
An AFWERX Phase I SBIR with a period of performance (PoP) from Dec 2019 to 
Mar 2020 served as a transition from the 2019 RRTO/NSW baseline CCS to the current 
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Phase II PoP running July 2020 to July 2021. The principal deliverables in the Phase II 
include 8 additional autonomy behaviors, adding support for 4 SOCOM-directed UxS, and 
studying secure communications methodologies as they can be applied to these platforms 
and C2 systems. 
5. Human-Machine Interface and Autonomy 
On the HMI side of development, Autonodyne has created a Common Control 
Station (CCS) application that intentionally does not require adding any hardware or 
software to the UxS platform. Instead, the company creates “software wrappers” that act 
as behind-the-scenes translators and command/control interfaces to the existing UxS 
platforms. One powerful legacy of both Avidyne and now Autonodyne is significant effort 
and success in designing highly intuitive interfaces designed to reduce operator cognitive 
burdens/workload while at the same time increasing functionality. 
On the autonomy side of development, Autonodyne has been executing a strategy 
of creating a library of autonomy behavior building blocks. Behaviors such as “Fly Over 
That,” “Hold Over There,” autonomous detection and avoidance of static and dynamic 
2D/3D obstacles/threats interwoven into autonomous path planning algorithms, were part 
of the baseline system by 2019 and actively used in programs and applications spanning 
the sUAS space to UCAS. 
6. Why a Common Control Station (CCS)? 
First and foremost, what this project is driving at is communicating the need for 
high levels of integration between components taking part in future battlefields. One must 
envision planes talking to ground forces who are talking to robot enablers both on the 
ground and in the air. All of this vertically integrated sharing C2, information streams, back 
calls, forward and backwards communications. 
As RAS’s begin to become established in the formations the CCS is the forward-
edge of the C2 infrastructure. The Joint Force CCS is required to capitalize on the 
employment of RAS and small unit maneuvering. As a force we need to educate ourselves 
as to what a CCS looks like NOW, so we can create and plan new Tactics, Techniques and 
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Procedures (TTPs) with these new systems. Cognitive overload can lead to confusion when 
working with the systems resulting in risk to performance and may ultimately hinder the 
development of future concepts like AISUM and the HEO.  
Finally, the Joint Force will need to streamline the C4ISR for these concepts to 
really work. There needs to be a robust, defensible, highly integrated intelligent system of 
autonomy instead of the heterogeneous systems of handsets and C2 currently on the 
shelves. The system will need to be fully integrated both vertically and horizontally across 
the battlefield and across component commands in order to maneuver the RAS’s across 
multiple domains in a way that takes full advantage of the emerging technology. This is 
not just Autonomy Within Systems, but also Computer Vision (CV) and Artificial 
Intelligence (AI).  
7. WHAT: RCU-1000 Common Control Station Application/Software 
a. Common Control Station Approach 
• Autonodyne is utilizing human centered design to meet requirements by 
teaming with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the Military and the 
private sector.  
• Multi-Input: Supports multi-touch (e.g., pinch zoom), traditional 
keyboard/mouse, commercial gaming controls (e.g. Xbox), and 
voice/gesture inputs from augmented reality devices (e.g. Meta2, Pison). 
• Hardware Agnostic: CS runs on most Windows 7 or later devices (PCs, 
laptops, tablets) as well as iOS and Linux and Android. Runs on Block 30 
F-16 center display unit & one of the 12 cores of F-35 mission computers 
• Link Agnostic: 8 links implemented, 5+ in work, working on cyber-
resiliency 
• Advanced Natural User Interface: Use advanced NUI designs running 
on mobile devices including use of augmented reality and UI elements 
from first-person shooter gaming system. 
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• RCU-1000 app: Designed to be a common user interface (UI) Common 
Control Station to allow a single operator to control and interact with 
several different UAS types and quantities.  
 
Figure 3. Dissimilar Platforms (sUAS) controlled by RCU-1000 
• RCU-1000 app is primarily a task-based control mechanism but also 
provides full manual control of an unmanned platform 
 
Figure 4. RCU-1000 CCS on Android End User Device 
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I. PRE-AIR FORCE SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH (SBIR) 
PHASE II (CURRENT AS OF 14JUL2020) 
1. Baseline Functionality 
a. Multi-vehicle, multi-domain demonstration at the November JIFX event. 
The vehicles above were controlled simultaneously via a single RCU-1000 
app. 
(1) Up to 8 simultaneous platforms demonstrated 
(2) Fixed wing, VTOL, Ground Rover 
b. Several high-level tasks/autonomous behaviors (“additive autonomy”) 
(1) Fly over that 
(2) Loiter 
(3) Hover 
c. 7 Datalinks supported 
(1) MPU 3/4/5, 
(2) Link 16 
(3) 9XX MHz DDLs 
(4) WiFi 
(5) 4/5G LTE 
a. TTNT 
b. Iridium SATCOM 
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d. ATAK and CoT Integration w/ up to 18 makes/models 
e. API exists for 3rd party use (e.g., add new vehicles or payloads)  
J. AIR FORCE SBIR PHASE II 
1. (1st 4 months) NPS Collaboration with Autonodyne  
a. Autonomous behaviors requirements 
(1) Capstone Team coordinated with JSOC-X, AFSOC, and Autonodyne to 
down-select from 25 candidate autonomy behaviors to the final 8 (Inspect, 
Observe, Follow Me, Stack, Surveil, Track, Impact, Morphing Swarm) 
b. Autonomous behavior storyboards 
(1) Capstone Team collaborated with Autonodyne to ensure Operational 
requirements were met when developing Storyboards. 
c. NPS Capstone Team has secured three loaner SRR platforms to support 
the CCS integration. 
d. Autonodyne has prototyped initial secure comm techniques (e.g. “Go 
Dark”) and is actively flight testing the capability. 
2. (2nd 6 months) Future Capstone Team  
a. NPS Capstone Team and JSOC-X operator feedback on the first four 
autonomy behaviors in an operationally representative environment 
followed by iterative updates as required. 
b. Collaborate with NSW sponsored NPS Professor on Effectiveness of 
Human-Machine Teams in UAV operations Experiment to find the 
optimal operator to platform ratio. 
c. Completing functional prototypes of next four autonomy behaviors. 
d. Integrating with SRR and other customer selected UxS platforms and 
demonstrating that integration in lab and field environments. 
e. MESH network integration and continued development and study in the 
area of secure communications. 
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APPENDIX B. AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS / USER INTERFACE / 
TRUST IN SYSTEMS 
As the Hyper Enabled Operator concept continues to evolve and humans become 
increasingly more reliant on autonomous systems to maintain battlefield supremacy, the 
human’s ability to control them while minimizing cognitive burden will be increasingly 
more important.52 Autonomous systems and Artificial Intelligence has the potential to 
improve the military’s effectiveness by providing timely and accurate intelligence to 
decision makers and operators on the ground. However, Neuroscientists widely agree that 
in order to prevent cognitive overload when controlling human-centered automated 
machines, the functionality and the interface must be prioritized.53 Individuals must be 
provided with the appropriate methods and time to train with the automation and artificial 
intelligence to ensure they trust the autonomous systems in order to decrease the cognitive 
effort required to monitor the unmanned systems.54  
When designing a human-centered automated machine, neuroscientists widely 
agree that the two main components which should be considered are the functionality and 
the interface.55 An effective automation interface design will directly improve the 
automated system’s situational awareness and also improve and calibrate the human’s trust 
in that automated system.56 The user interface and system functionality must provide a 
clear mapping for the operator so that the individual can create an interface which is 
compatible with their goals and mental models.57 To improve human interaction with 
                                                 
52 Adams, “Cognitive Task Analysis for Unmanned Aerial System Design,” 2426. 
53 Raja Parasuraman, Thomas B. Sheridan, and Christopher D. Wickens, “Situation Awareness, 
Mental Workload, and Trust in Automation: Viable, Empirically Supported Cognitive Engineering 
Constructs,” Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 2, no. 2 (June 2008): 154, 
https://doi.org/10.1518/155534308X284417. 
54 Endsley, “From Here to Autonomy,” 8. 
55 Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens, “Situation Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust in 
Automation,” 154. 
56 Endsley, “From Here to Autonomy,” 10. 
57 Endsley, 11. 
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autonomous systems, design interventions include human–automation interface features 
and central automation interaction paradigms comprising levels of automation, adaptive 
automation, and granularity of control approaches. 
Computer Science professor from Vanderbilt University, Dr. Julie Adams, PhD, 
writes in Handbook of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, in her chapter “Cognitive Task Analysis 
for Unmanned Aerial System Design,” that humans are factored into the unmanned systems 
platform and payload design after the systems have been built. She expounds that, “such 
system design approaches do not properly consider the human cognitive limitations and do 
not design the system to support the human’s tasks and decision-making.”58 With military 
Special Operations Forces and others operating in dynamic environments, the integration 
of the humans cognitive ability to control the systems to minimize overload and maximize 
effectiveness must be considered in the initial design phase. 
Prioritizing training with Artificial Intelligence and automated systems to build the 
operators’ trust in the salience of information the systems provide will decrease the 
cognitive effort required to monitor the unmanned systems.59 In 1983, cognitive 
psychologist Lisanne Bainbridge wrote a research paper titled, “Ironies of Automation,” in 
which she states that, “when workload is the highest, it is often of the least assistance.”60 
Sporadic implementation of future technology in training will prevent the individual from 
valuing the timely information being provided.  
In his 2017 journal article, From Here to Autonomy, Mica Endsley highlights that, 
while automation is designed to relieve complexity, a lack of trust in the system may have 
the opposite effect if the operator must maintain situational awareness and inject 
corrections to ensure that it is performing correctly.61 Endsley points out that “increasing 
automation reliability and robustness will act to decrease attention allocation to 
                                                 
58 Adams, “Cognitive Task Analysis for Unmanned Aerial System Design,” 2425. 
59 Endsley, “From Here to Autonomy,” 8. 
60 Endsley, 12.  
61 Endsley, 9. 
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automation performance, as moderated through operator trust.” Endsley highlights that 
when dealing with humans and machines, the complexity to the situational awareness, the 
monitoring of autonomous systems, and building trust in the systems is called the Human-
Autonomy System Oversight (HASO). Endsley suggests that in order to gain the trust of 
the systems, thorough training and drilling with the systems will reduce cognitive burden. 
As is outlined in the Department of Defense (DOD) Data Strategy, if the data is not 
trustworthy and operators lack confidence in the systems, then this may impede the 
decision maker’s judgment and prevent the optimal choice from being made.62 
The data management and presentation of unmanned systems information to the 
operator are the most vital aspects of an effective user interface and user experience. In the 
DOD’s 2020 Data Strategy, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist highlights that 
data is a strategic asset that can significantly improve the military’s effectiveness by 
providing timely and accurate intelligence to decision makers and operators on the ground. 
Maintaining the strategic, operational, and tactical advantage will require coordinating the 
combined collection of a variety of data sources to provide accurate situational awareness 
to the decision maker in a usable manner.63 Under the DOD Data Strategy, the DOD 
identifies seven Goals to become a data-centric DOD. These seven principles apply not 
only to the leaders in Joint Operations Centers to make strategic decisions but also to the 
tactical leader or individual soldier as they reduce military footprint but increase available 
information. Alvin Toffler in his 1970 book Future Shock writes that, “Overstimulation 
can occur on at least three different levels: the sensory, the cognitive, and the decisional.”64 
As it relates to the user interface and information flow of data, making the data 
understandable, visible and most importantly linked are of critical significance to the 
success of the end user.  
                                                 
62 Department of Defense, Executive Summary: DOD Data Strategy - Unleashing Data to Advance 
the National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: DOD, 2020), 8. 
63 Department of Defense, 1, 7. 
64 Toffler, Future Shock, 348. 
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As the UAS systems gain autonomy to conduct more robust tasking, the human’s 
ability to control the machines must become increasingly more reliant on robust autonomy 
and artificial intelligence to reduce the cognitive burden and the team size required to 
operate the machines.65 The Man and Unmanned Machine Teaming (MUM-T) interaction 
is directly proportional to the expectations humans place on systems. Due to the complexity 
of full automation, Endsley states that, “the development of autonomous systems that can 
support (man and unmanned teaming), should be based on a detailed foundation of research 
on human automation interaction.”66 As a result of the complexity of automated systems, 
the combination of what Endsley states is “cognitive complexity, display complexity, and 
task complexity of the system created by the automation interface,” the interaction between 
the human and machine teaming will be increasingly important as more systems become 
semi-autonomous.  
Situational awareness for disaggregated teams in a dynamic environment creates 
an inherently complex position. In their book, Designing for Situation Awareness, An 
Approach to User-Centered Design, Endsley, Bolte and Jones discuss the Goal Directed 
Task Analysis (GDTA) as a type of cognitive task analysis which emphasizes situational 
awareness in a dynamic environment.67 Taking Endsley’s work into an even more military 
appropriate domain, Humphrey and Adams expound upon the GDTA principle in a journal 
article titled, “Analysis of Complex Team-Based Systems,” in which they linked basic 
goals and decision questions that the individual operating the drones must complete in 
order to integrate properly with the UAS.68 Adams then applied her studies on GDTA to 
an existing project which uses UASs for wilderness search and rescue called WiSAR. The 
results of the integration between the GDTA and the WiSAR was that it highlighted to the 
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Search and Rescue (SAR) leadership what situational awareness information the UAS can 
collect to help the searches on the ground. It additionally identified cognitive tasks that 
burdened the drone operator, helped to find better searching methods, and improve overall 
communications between element leaders.69  
12/4/2020 3:47:00 PMIn Alvin Toffler’s 1970 book Future Shock he states, 
“communications systems designer Sol Cornberg, a radical prophet in the field of library 
technology, declared that reading would soon cease to be a primary form of information 
intake.”70 Toffler’s intent with this statement is to symbolize the rapid expansion of 
information available to each individual and the many methods which they can perceive 
and process that information. He breaks down the reception of information into uncoded 
and coded messages. Uncoded signals are how someone perceives what they hear, see, or 
feel through their sensory apparatus and in what way they form a mental image of that 
sensory signal referred to as a message. Humans also receive coded messages, or messages 
conveyed by means of a language, dance step, pictograph or other arrangement. While both 
coded and uncoded forms of communication are relevant to the military operator, “more of 
our imagery derives from man-made messages than from personal observations of raw, 
“uncoded” events.”  
With the improvement of technology and the artfully crafted and carefully spread 
messages from mass media by communications experts, humans receive and read massive 
quantities of meticulously crafted messages daily. As a result, Toffler states that the 
information perceived is “highly purposive, preprocessed to eliminate unnecessary 
repetition, consciously designed to maximize information content. It is, as communications 
theorists say, ‘information-rich.’”71 In 1970, Toffler reported that the average American is 
exposed to an average of 560 advertising messages per day – of which they only notice 76 
in order to “preserve their attention for other matters.” To ensure that their advertisement 
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will be one of the 76 memorable ones, Toffler states that advertisers will use symbolic art 
techniques combined with “verbal and visual to accelerate image-flow… to communicate 
maximum imagery in minimum time.”72 In a similar way as advertisers capture the 
individual’s attention, options should be provided to the individual in the battlefield to 
capture their attention when required to highlight imminent threats, but also be able to 
provide access to less important information at the individuals inquiries rather than 
flooding them with information.  
A. COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS 
To identify the optimal human centric system, the focus can be narrowed down to 
three specific functions – cognitive task analysis, cognitive work analysis, and information 
flow analysis.73 From a cognitive capabilities perspective, Dr. Adams states that 
“Cognitive task analysis seeks to understand the cognition required by the human user to 
complete tasks and how to turn that understanding into tools that assist the human.”74 The 
methods which people receive and transmit information varies widely based on their 
backgrounds, genetics and physical human performance. As a result, Dr. Adam’s states 
that machine systems which will be controlled should provide adjustable control modalities 
to match the cognitive demands of the operator based on their specific learning 
requirements and adjust them to meet the increased stress caused in a dynamic 
environment.  
Cognitive task analysis is the focus on the individual’s cognitive requirements to 
conduct a task, how to train the human to control the system, and ultimately to design a 
system so that it best serves the human. When controlling a UAS, Dr. Adam’s shows that 
the individual is responsible for supervising the automated system, commanding it to 
conduct the task required, and also must interact with the UAS through a control station.75 
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The burden of each requirement is significant and is compounded when the requirement is 
to operate in a dynamic environment and to then react to changes by notifying other 
personnel in the group of imminent threats, calling in an air strike on the target, or 
maneuvering troops against the enemy. In these scenarios, it will become increasing 
important for the Ground Force Commander to maintain situational awareness while 
managing unmanned assets. 
Another critical component when designing the Common Control Station for 
controlling multiple UASs is the cognitive work analysis.76 Dr. Adams describes that the 
work analysis aspect measures the human’s workload on a specific device, separate from 
the individual operator’s capabilities. More directly, she supports that the work analysis 
attempts to find different ways that the tasks can be completed, such as optimizing the 
social and technical factors, to improve the overall operating function of the systems. 
Adams refines the definition of the work analysis by writing that its function is “to better 
integrate cognitive analysis and the design and development of revolutionary systems.”77 
In the end, the cognitive work analysis function is designed to identify the problem the 
system is attempting to monitor or fix, and to optimize how that information is present to 
the operator. This function leads in well to the last function, which is the information 
analysis. 
The cognitive information flow analysis intent is to highlight methods to improve 
the flow of information, identify when too much information is overloading the human 
user, and then to sort out where that information should go so that it is presented to the 
right people at the right time.78 In a writing Adams did with Humphrey in 2010 titled, 
“Cognitive information flow analysis,” in Cognition, Technology, and Work, they merge 
together the cognitive tasks with cognitive work analysis to understand the optimal flow 
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and analysis of information.79 The flow analysis method helps the designers to understand 
the method which the information is being created, processed, and then disseminated into 
the system, and who is using and benefiting from that information.80 The information 
production is all of the data that is input into the system whether by sensors, humans or 
artificial intelligence. The consumption of information is when the systems or the human 
uses it to complete a function. And the transformation is when the consumption of the 
information by a process results in new information.81  
In the end, the combination of cognitive task analysis, cognitive work analysis, and 
information flow analysis can provide a very valuable method to design the UAS 
controlling and information dissemination systems. While there is no definitive method to 
conduct this in a dynamic environment where contingency management is the most critical 
aspect, the combination of the man and machine can be optimized to relieve workload 
whenever possible to allow the human operator the mental bandwidth to make decisions 
when the computer becomes overwhelmed.  
In their writing, Situation Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust in Automation: 
Viable, Empirically Supported Cognitive Engineering Constructs, authors Parasuraman, 
Sheridan and Wickens conclude that, “Situational awareness, mental workload, and trust 
are viable constructs that are valuable in understanding and predicting human-system 
performance in complex systems.”82 The basis behind their research states that Human 
Factors/ Ergonomics (HF/E) must have a human performance baseline from which to 
design complex human-machine systems. Automated systems can alleviate workload and 
enhance operator situational awareness. They can also provide opportunities for operators 
to build too much trust in the system, which, when it ultimately breaks down, can increase 
                                                 
79 Curtis M. Humphrey and Julie A. Adams, “Cognitive Information Flow Analysis,” Cognition, 
Technology & Work 15, no. 2 (May 1, 2013): 133, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-011-0198-z. 
80 Adams, “Cognitive Task Analysis for Unmanned Aerial System Design,” 2433. 
81 Adams, 2433. 
82 Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens, “Situation Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust in 
Automation,” 140. 
   
 
35 
the cognitive burden on the individual. Ultimately, trust in the systems is paramount to 
creating a successful socio-technical system. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS / CONCLUSION 
When designing autonomous systems using artificial intelligence, the functionality 
and the user interface must be a priority for technology designers to alleviate cognitive load 
on the military operator.83 Significant amounts of data and information can be available to 
the operators which, under optimal conditions and with the proper training, can provide 
them with significantly more battlefield situational awareness than is available today. The 
Special Operations Forces Community must prioritize early, and consistent training with 
Artificial Intelligence and automated systems to build the operators’ trust in the salience of 
information provided so the operators can decrease the cognitive effort required to monitor 
the unmanned systems.84 Trust in the autonomy systems and Artificial Intelligence is 
critical to creating a successful socio-technical system in which the human operator trusts 
the autonomous systems which surround them. 
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APPENDIX C. COGNITIVE LOAD 
The overstimulated soldier in combat finds themselves flooded with uncertainty 
and ambiguity, or as 19th century Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz termed 
it, the fog of war.85 The British coined this overstimulation Long Range Penetration Strain, 
described as when a soldier became, “incapable of doing the simplest thing for himself and 
seemed to have the mind of a child.”86 Regardless of the terminology, psychologists 
unanimously agree on two cognitive load principles: first, that humans have a limited 
cognitive capacity; and second, that cognitively overloading one’s system leads to a 
significant decrease in performance.87 These experiences significantly degrade the 
human’s ability to receive information and causes their minds to be more closely related to 
a schizophrenic mind than a normally functioning individual.88 Identifying cognitive 
overload in stressful situations, and then adjusting individual training to mitigate its 
impacts on the operator, is the beginning to creating organizational changes which will 
optimize the individual’s impact on the battlefield. It will become increasingly important 
for Special Forces organizations to train and drill with existing and innovative technology 
which can identify and remedy individual’s cognitive overload, and to adapt the technology 
so those operators can comprehend greater information in order to prevent decision 
paralysis. New advances in wearable technology, and algorithms to identify physiological 
changes to identify cognitive load, are being developed that will improve the ability to 
identify, and then theoretically reduce, cognitive load.89  
Cognitively overloading the mind with excess data has been shown to create the 
fog of war in soldiers, culture shock in travelers, or disaster shock in victims of traumatic 
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experiences. The psychological effects of overstimulation in combat has nearly identical 
cognitive and physiological symptoms as culture shock and disaster shock. Alvin Toffler, 
prominent futurist and best-selling author on technologic impacts on humans, states that 
the person who experiences a disaster will often show “confusion, anxiety, irritability and 
withdrawal into apathy.”90 He continues in his book Future Shock that the traveler who 
immerses themselves into a foreign culture, albeit devoid of war or chaos and in a benign 
and peaceful environment, can become overwhelmed by the enormity of the novel 
experiences which prevents them from grasping and cognitively processing the new 
objects, sights, sounds and events. A common symptom of culture shock on the traveler is, 
as psychologist Sven Lundstedt describes it, a “feeling of loss, and a sense of isolation and 
loneliness,” such that he or she becomes “anxious, confused and often appears apathetic.”91 
According to Toffler, the linkage between combat stress, disaster and culture shock all 
share three basic similarities: confusion and disorientation, fatigue and extreme irritability, 
and a point of no return upon which apathy and emotional withdrawal set in.  
Information studies psychologist Dr. James Miller, former director of the Mental 
Health Research Institute at the University of Michigan, also found that very similar 
performance characteristics were identified between those of cognitively overloaded 
individuals and people with mental illness – specifically schizophrenics.92 According to 
Dr. Miller, one of the main features of a schizophrenic is that their minds produce words 
and phrases in an “incorrect associative response,” or they categorize words or situations 
in “arbitrary or highly personalized categories.” For example, when presented with a series 
of similar physical objects such as Legos or marbles, the healthy person will categorize 
them in geometric shapes. According to Dr. Miller, a schizophrenic, on the other hand, may 
categorize them subjectively or as a group of feelings. To describe his findings more 
specifically, in his book Disorders of Communication, Miller tested two groups of mentally 
healthy individuals. One group was provided with words or concepts and was allowed to 
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work at their own pace, while the other group was provided the same information but under 
a time constraint. The results showed that those under the conditions of greater time 
constraints and higher information input generated responses with “errors more like those 
of schizophrenics than of self-paced normals.” Or to put it more directly, normal humans 
under excessive cognitive load produce similar results as schizophrenics under normal 
conditions.  
A significant number of scientific studies show that humans have a very narrow 
limit of working memory, and the Cognitive Load Theory supports that the design of 
education must respect those limitations.93 Psychologist George A. Miller of Rockefeller 
University states that, “there are severe limitations on the amount of information that we 
are able to receive, process, and remember.”94 While the military operator must consider 
a wide spectrum of problems in their pursuit of preventing cognitive overload, the 
requirement is also a heuristic one which will employ a practical solution to a problem that 
may not be optimal, but is sufficient for achieving the tactical or operational solution. 
Improving cognitive load capability to prevent decision paralysis can be thought of 
similarly to training for a physical sporting event. There is a cost-risk-benefit analysis for 
cognitive loading when considering what information is presented to the individual and 
how that information is disseminated.  
Identical to the human body succumbing to overstimulation when being immersed 
into a disaster scenario, the cognitive decision making processes behave unpredictably 
when overloaded.95 While the limits to cognitive learning are yet unknown, the energy 
demand placed on learning is significant, and it opens the environment for a potentially 
disastrous social situation – or as Alvin Toffler calls it, “Future shock.”96 Toffler finds that 
at the neurological level, there are limits on the speed and quantity of images that any 
                                                 
93 Jimmie Leppink, “Cognitive Load Theory: Practical Implications and an Important Challenge,” 
Journal of Taibah University Medical Sciences 12, no. 5 (October 2017): 386, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtumed.2017.05.003. 
94 Toffler, Future Shock, 1990, 351. 
95 Toffler, 343. 
96 Toffler, 181. 
   
 
40 
individual is capable of processing. In a similar vein, placing significant amounts of 
technology on an individual in a dynamic and novel situation greatly increases the risk for 
information overload, and relieving that cognitive burden through trustworthy artificial 
intelligence, appropriate training, and tailored design will create better decision makers.  
When an individual is immersed into a new, rapidly changing and dynamic 
situation, Toffler highlights that, “predictive accuracy plummets… (and they) can no 
longer make the reasonably correct assessments on which rational behavior is 
dependent.”97 He goes on to suggest that for an individual to react “normally” and make 
effective, rational decisions, they must be able to process more information than ever 
before, at an extremely high rate of speed. In combat, the Special Operations Forces 
operators will experience dynamic and changing environments. To prevent information 
overload from mentally paralyzing the individual, they must be able to think faster and 
process higher volumes of information. Identifying the existing technology to help provide 
the training, drills, and mental stimulation to help individuals process greater information 
loads will create better leaders by preventing decision paralysis. 
A. TRAINING TO REDUCE COGNITIVE LOAD 
A variety of training, drilling, and readiness measures can alleviate cognitive load 
and prepare the individual for complex situations. Maintaining the optimum physical 
performance directly relates to the mind’s ability to cognitively process information, 
drilling correctly to build trust in the equipment, and data management. Although some 
human reactions to novel and dynamic experiences result in involuntary responses by the 
individual, most human reactions are preceded by conscious thought, a reaction that is a 
result of the individual’s ability to absorb information, process, react and retain 
information.98 According to Toffler, every individual’s ability to handle sensory input is a 
result of their physiological makeup. He goes on to explain that the individual’s physical 
organs and how quickly their body sends impulses throughout its neural system creates 
                                                 
97 Toffler, 351. 
98 Toffler, Future Shock, 1990, 349–50. 
   
 
41 
biological limitations to the speed and amount of data that can be transmitted. This 
highlights the importance of selecting future Special Operations Forces who are cognitively 
capable, and can train to and rapidly process scenarios, which should inherently decrease 
the overstimulation in combat and improve their performance under stress.  
In his short story “Superiority,” Arthur C. Clarke laments on the cause of the failure 
of a militaries far superior forces to defeat the enemy – defeated “by the inferior science of 
our enemies. I repeat – by the inferior science of our enemies.”99 Despite the initial 
advantage of technologically advanced weaponry, and the military calls to improve their 
existing weapon, he points out that the “existing weapons have practically reached 
finality… that there has been no basic change in armaments for over a century.”100 With 
many similarities, while the tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the technology which 
the United States has used to conduct warfare since World War II has advanced in many 
ways, the method which the United States trains has adapted very incrementally.  
Cognitively burdening individuals has proven to lead to reduced information intake 
and increased stress with negative outcomes. Relieving the mind of problem-solving during 
training scenarios will speed up the learning processes. Limiting problem solving 
techniques to selection and assessment scenarios or select testing situations where the goal 
is to identify individual strengths and weaknesses will enhance learning with degrading the 
long-term objective – better operators. Neuroscience experts from Qneuro, a leading neuro-
optimization for an accelerated learning company, projects that, “personalized learning 
informed by both performance and neuro-physiological data” can now be used to “not only 
optimize the way the military designs training but also raise the cognitive advantage across 
the force.”101 To measure cognitive load, nascent wearable technology is becoming 
available which will allow operators in a dynamic environment to be measured in real time 
to assess the cognitive burdens they are operating under. The other key aspect which 
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remains in its infancy, however, is the real time data processing to analyze the information 
as it is being collected to build algorithms to quickly assess the readings.102  
To help identify when an individual is being overloaded, scientists can measure 
cognitive load (CL) through the Electroencephalography (EEG) to provide real-time 
analysis.103 While there are more complex methods to measure CL and a few which are 
less burdensome, the EEG and new wearable technology is emerging and becoming more 
accessible for scientists and engineers to study and analyze the individuals collected data, 
according to Dr. Walcutt. With real time neuromonitoring, professionals can provide 
personalized content for enhanced learning, or provide immediate feedback on the user’s 
mental capacity. While at the end of the year 2020 the wearable devices and the human 
studies are still prototypes which require engineers to conduct data analysis on each 
experiment, algorithm generation is ongoing and within a couple of years, the algorithm 
creation should rapidly decrease the cost, time and effort of identifying physiological signs 
of cognitive overload.104 
Technology is currently available in a static environment which can measure 
physiological symptoms such as eye tracking software, heart rate, breathing, pupil size, 
and a variety of other factors to identify performance parameters while conducting realistic 
operations in Augmented Reality headsets.105 In a laboratory setting, this data is then 
analyzed by data engineers and electronic gamers to identify immediate action, goal 
directed behaviors to identify time-lock actions to know when people are performing better 
or worse. For a more dynamic environment, Northwestern University has partnered with a 
company called Neurolux to develop a wearable Bio-Mechanical Acoustic Device 
(BMAD) the size of a human thumb which can monitor up to 30 different dynamic 
responses to identify immediate human responses to situations. While the technology to 
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collect the raw data is currently available, it can only be done in a static environment and 
requires data engineers to process and analyze the information. 
According to Andrew Huberman, neuroscientist and professor from Stanford 
University, the key to optimal performance is optimizing nervous system function – or 
neural fitness.106 He describes Neural fitness as the balance between physical, emotional 
and cognitive fitness. Just as physical conditioning revolves around endurance, strength, 
mobility and flexibility, emotional fitness revolves around positive feelings and reflections. 
Likewise, cognitive fitness is described as maintaining creativity, memory, focus and task 
switching. Further research into the physical and mental health has been done by Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) student, Major Scott Cook, and can be found in the NPS thesis 
library for further reading. 
Dr. Jimmie Leppink, psychologist and senior lecturer in medical education, has 
identified through corroborating research three guidelines for the design of educational 
instruction and assessment. To optimize learning in the cognitive load theory requires, as 
he states, the “development and automation of cognitive schemas,” under three types of 
cognitive load: intrinsic cognitive load (ICL), extraneous cognitive load (ECL), and 
germane cognitive load (GCL).107 According to Leppink, intrinsic cognitive load is when 
an individual is confronted with information that is about to be learned and the mind has 
not yet created schemas for this information – or it is not yet mentally automated in their 
way of thinking. Extraneous cognitive load is a result of cognitive processes that exist but 
do not contribute to cognitive learning. And finally, germane cognitive load is the cognitive 
load that is directly related to and beneficial to learning, to include asking appropriate 
questions about the topic, being able to accurately explain it to others and following up the 
learning with more education. 
Two simple models exist to explain the improvement of learning – one which seeks 
to minimize ECL, or cognitive learning that does not contribute to learning, and one with 
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a direct relationship between ICL and GCL.108 Leppink explains that first method to 
reduce the ECL and point new learners in the right direction is to provide them with an 
example of successfully completed problem first to help them identify a successful method 
to complete the task. The learner should attempt to eliminate distractions from learning 
such as emotions from previous mistakes, confusing instructions from peers or instructors, 
or extreme complexities beyond the student’s capacity. Leppink explains that the second 
method to improving ICL and reducing ECL is to have specific and realistic goals for what 
the objective is that they students are trying to learn.109 For example, a military operator 
who has never faced realistic challenges may focus on the wrong details of a contingency 
in an operation which would increase their ECL (cognitive distractions) and decrease their 
ICL (cognitive learning abilities). The conclusion for the ICL/GCL (stimulate learning/ 
create long-term schema) relationship while minimizing the ECL (mental distractions) is 
to set realistic goals for the learning objectives which do not over complicate the learners’ 
capabilities. Leppink explains that the instruction should be presented simply and clearly, 
attempts should be made to reduce external student complications and provide realistic 
examples which clearly show what the expectations are for the exercise.  
In his 1988 journal article titled “Cognitive Load during Problem Solving: Effects 
on Learning,” John Sweller describes how domain specific knowledge, known as schemas, 
are the primary aspect which delineates novices from experts in problem-solving.110 
Sweller describes a schema as the mind’s ability to recognize that a problem exists in a 
particular category, and then to apply the particular moves to solve that problem from 
existing experiences. He postulates that problem solving in the means-ends method is an 
ineffective learning device because the cognitive process required to problem solve does 
not overlap the cognitive processes of learning. Additionally, the problem solving requires 
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such a large cognitive workload that the mind is then unavailable to create schemas.111 
One example Sweller uses is a chess master versus a novice chess player. A master chess 
player, he explains, will have multiple schemas planned from the start, whereas a novice 
player will begin with the end goal and apply a series of means to achieve that goal – not 
choosing a known or very likely solution to their problem. Applying this theory to the 
military, ground force commanders and their artificial intelligence systems can work 
together to help achieve the expert level despite having less experience than an expert.  
According to Dr. Sweller, conventional problem solving is not an effective learning 
method.112 During a complex problem-solving scenario, Sweller teaches that the cognitive 
load imposed during a means-ends analysis may significantly degrade the learning during 
problem solving, and “leads to problem-solution, not to schema acquisition.” While it 
would be assumed that to build more schemas, or patterns to solve problems, would be to 
practice on a large number of problems to build problem-solving skills, Sweller concludes 
through many years of studies that this method is ineffective. As a result, regardless of the 
outcome, a very little amount of long-term memory creation has actually taken place.  
Excessive reliance on these actions, without preformed schema, may lead to 
excessive cognitive load.113 Furthermore, while large cognitive load during problem 
solving hinders learning, scientists assume three things: 1) that each human has a fixed 
cognitive capacity; 2) that both problem solving and learning will take up that cognitive 
capacity; and 3) that problem solving and learning are different cognitive functions.114 The 
resulting outcome, according to Sweller, is that any increased mental bandwidth absorbed 
by the mind during problem solving will have a direct decrease on the minds ability to 
learn. The importance here for the military can be directly applied to not only the common, 
“crawl, walk, run,” method of instruction, but also the importance of Artificial Intelligence 
                                                 
111 Sweller, “Cognitive Load During Problem Solving: Effects on Learning,” 257. 
112 Sweller, 260, 283. 
113 Sweller, 265. 
114 Sweller, 275. 
   
 
46 
to apply historic lessons learned into future military technology to absorb the added strain 
of problem solving on future operators.  
In Information, Power, and Grand Strategy: In Athena’s Camp, Dr. John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt highlight the increasing importance in the relationship between 
information and power, proposing that the trends between them may provide implications 
on the “theory and practice of warfare and for grand strategy in times ahead.”115 In 
Athena’s Camp breaks down information into three different views: 1) Information as the 
inherent message; 2) information as the medium of production, storage, transmission, and 
reception; and 3) information as a physical property.116 While much is written on the 
theory of power, Athena’s Camp breaks power into three areas: 1) material; 2) 
organizational (or systemic), and 3) immaterial in nature. Arquilla and Ronfeldt apply these 
powers across the political, military and economic fields.117 The merging of the two 
theories of information and power are inversely related. The traditional view will propose 
that information is historically important and valuable and will continue to become more 
important. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, however, argue “a new Athena-like view” that states 
information is a much larger, more complex problem than originally postulated and should 
be viewed “as a basic, underlying and overarching dynamic of all theory and practice about 
warfare in the information-age.”118 
In the view of Athena, the Greek goddess of warrior wisdom, the future merging of 
information and power happens where information becomes physical and power becomes 
immaterial.119 In a step into the future, and a concept which is in line with the historic war 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s theories, the Athenan future warfare concept minimizes 
internal disorganization and maximizes disruption against the enemy. The optimal 
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information and power merging will be a system which can provide data and systems 
information in a model that maintains robust power and resistance from disruption. 
Athena’s Camp says that maximum information matter must be processed and provided to 
the individual, organization, or nation which it is serving in a manner that it can be used to 
achieve victory. The data processing and transmission of that information to the individual 
in the information-age will be increasingly difficult in communications denied 
environment, but also increasingly important as the information processing requirements 
grow and the mind’s ability to process it remains mostly static. 
B. CONCLUSION/ RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendation A 
To mitigate the detrimental effects of cognitive overload on operators, the military 
must first invest in technology to identify and quantify real-time cognitive overload in a 
dynamic, Full Mission Profile (FMP) scenario. Using the Virtual and Augment Reality 
headsets, human systems integration and tests should be  conducted using the Ground 
Force Commander simulation trainers to measure an operator’s physiological symptoms to 
identify cognitive load. The available  systems use off-the-shelf eye tracking 
software, heart rate monitoring, breathing rates, pupil size and a variety of other factors, 
and once analyzed by data engineers, instructors can identify areas of learning 
improvement.120 As the Bio-Mechanical Acoustic Device wearable technology becomes 
more mainstream, and the data algorithms have been robustly developed, military operators 
and leaders can use these devices to monitor the cognitive load on their forces. The neuro-
physiologic measuring devices can be used during training to identify specific weaknesses 
and build individualized training plans. They can also during combat operations to 
highlight combat stress and to improve the military team’s effectiveness.  
2. Recommendation B 
Refocus the Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) to emphasize the importance 
of wearable technology to achieve individual Neural Fitness – or  the balance of 
                                                 
120 Huberman and Golden, “Biomechanical Acoustic Devices and Measuring Biologic Signals.” 
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cognitive, emotional, and physical fitness.121 As the Preservation of the Force and Families 
initiative in the military continues, continuous physical and  mental health monitoring 
using data collected from emerging wearable devices should be invested in and become a 
daily part of the individual health and neural fitness. These impacts may reach beyond 
military training and have an impact on post-traumatic stress disorders and suicide 
prevention, by identifying individual  cognitive load.  
3. Recommendation C 
Operators should take cognitive assessments on their ability to perceive and receive 
information, then have professionals assist them with setting up the information they 
receive toward their strengths and weaknesses. For example, if someone is an auditory 
learner, more important information may be provided audibly. If they perceive information 
more efficiently visually, then more can be  placed in an Augmented Reality heads up 
display.  
Identifying cognitive overload in stressful situations, and then adjusting individual 
training to mitigate its impacts on the operator, is the beginning to creating organizational 
changes which will optimize the individual’s impact on the battlefield. It will become 
increasingly important for Special Forces organizations to train and drill with existing and 
innovative technology which can identify and remedy individual’s cognitive overload, and 
to adapt the technology so those operators can comprehend greater information in order to 
prevent decision paralysis. 
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APPENDIX D. USER EXPERIENCE AND USER 
INTERFACE DESIGN 
How will wars be fought in the next 10, 20, or 50 years? Rapidly improving 
technology, has the potential to leave the human behind and overwhelmed without 
thoughtful development of user experience/user interface (UX/UI) to ensure true “human-
machine teaming.” This appendix will not only show the importance of user design but 
establish a common framework and terminology, and then illustrate how industry design 
practices in the technology field can be incorporated into AISUM. Interface design is the 
linchpin between the technology and the end user, it is the bridge between AI and SU, in 
AISUM. For the program to be successful not only does the technology have to work, but 
the end user needs to adopt, incorporate, and embrace the capability. Unfortunately, the 
United States military has countless examples of failure to focus on the end users at the 
beginning and during the entire acquisition process. At its core this capstone’s goal is to 
ensure innovation adoption at the tactical level, by not just focusing on the technology, but 
instead, the user. When we look closer at User Experience (UX) and User Interface (UI) 
specifically related to Artificial Intelligence for Small Unit Maneuver (AISUM) and the 
common control station (CCS) that Autonodyne is creating for SOCOM, it is clear there is 
a critical need for purposeful UX/UI design influenced by operational subject matter 
experts (SME) to ensure true human-machine teaming. As technology improves and drones 
become more prevalent and necessary on the battlefield, human operators must still be able 
to maintain situational awareness in the context of human-machine teaming without being 
overtasked or cognitively overloaded.  
In order to examine specific details of UI and UX systems, we must first establish 
a taxonomy of fundamental principles and definitions since terms vary among differing 
industries, academia, and within the Department of Defense (DOD) itself. We use SAE 
International’s definition of Human Systems Integration (HSI) as “the management and 
technical discipline of planning, enabling, coordinating, and optimizing all human-related 
considerations during system design, development, test, production, use and disposal of 
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systems, subsystems, equipment, and facilities.”122 The key part of the definition is the 
optimization of human-related considerations throughout the life cycle of a product. Failing 
to consider the human element leads to constant redesigns resulting in delays and additional 
costs.  
HSI originated with the DOD as part of the total systems approach to acquisitions 
directed by DOD 5000.02 with the goal of “optimizing total system performance among 
hardware, software, and human assets, operational effectiveness, suitability, survivability, 
safety, and affordability.”123 This emphasis on optimizing the total system and specifically 
including human resources is an important principle that considers the context in which 
hardware and software are intended to be used. Accepting that system performance requires 
maximizing human capabilities, it becomes apparent that the principles of HSI need to be 
incorporated throughout the DOD’s acquisition process (illustrated below). 
 
                                                 
122 G-45 Human Systems Integration, Standard Practice for Human Systems Integration (United 
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123 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, DOD Instruction 5000.02 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017), 52. 




Figure 5. Model 1: Hardware Intensive Program124 
The DOD’s acquisition process is phase-based with each phase culminating in a 
milestone at which point it is determined if the process should proceed to the next phase 
(indicated by the A, B, and C above). Milestone approval is contingent on the fulfillment 
of certain criteria that is defined in relation to the project’s goals. HSI, specifically with 
operational SME’s involvement, cannot begin during Operational Test & Evaluation 
(OT&E) at which point the product has already been designed, engineered, and 
manufactured and when addressing problems requires redesign that delays final operational 
capability and delivery of an often-critical product to the warfighter. This is why DOD 
Instruction 5000.02 specifically requires Program Managers to take steps through “contract 
deliverables, government and contractor integrated product teams, and other mechanisms 
to ensure ergonomics, human factors engineering, and cognitive engineering is employed 
throughout the systems engineering process and over the life of the program in order to 
ensure effective human-machine interfaces and fulfillment of all HSI requirements.”125 
Instruction 5000.02 goes on to specify, “system designs will minimize or eliminate system 
characteristics that require excessive cognitive, physical, or sensory skills; entail extensive 
                                                 
124Source: Department of Defense, 8. 
125 Department of Defense, 79. 
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training or workload-intensive tasks; result in mission-critical errors; or produce safety or 
health hazards.”126 Unfortunately, this is not always the case, and every member of this 
capstone team has experienced, during the course of their career, HSI not being properly 
considered during the development of a product or device intended for the warfighter to 
utilize in combat.  
A simple example that illustrates this occurred during OT&E of the AC-130J. A 
particular piece of equipment was installed across all C-130Js that Air Force Special 
Operations Command (AFSOC) had in its inventory. To make the installation simple, it 
was decided at the program level to install the new equipment in the same place on each 
variant of C-130J. However, on the AC-130J there was a piece of communications 
equipment in the way of the new install, which engineers moved to accommodate the new 
device. It was not until a flyer saw the modification already completed that anyone realized 
a big problem. The operator did not need to directly interact with the new piece of 
equipment that had been installed in a location that is ergonomically and proximally 
optimal for operators to reach. The communications equipment that was previously in that 
location, however, is used by operators on every flight and must be physically touched to 
function. To accommodate the new install, the communications device was moved to the 
top of the aircraft making it unreachable during flight. The failure to understand what was 
being moved and how it was utilized by operators led to serious issues that had to be 
resolved. There are a lot of factors that play into where to install something in an aircraft, 
such as weight, access to power, heat, utility, and size; however, in this instance there was 
a failure in HSI. This happened because the human element was not taken into 
consideration, resulting in unnecessary redesigns, delays, and additional cost. The effects 
of these deficiencies in execution have been costly and time-consuming, ballooning 
program budgets and delaying timelines. A 2005 U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report concluded that “major weapon systems programs experience early cost 
increases by an average of 42% over original estimates and schedule slips by an average 
of almost 20%; of the identified overrun causes.” GAO analysts determined that “most 
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were the result of problems that could have been discovered early in the design process.”127 
By properly applying HSI earlier in the process these issues can be identified prior to design 
and manufacturing, thus saving time and money.  
As previously mentioned, terminology can get confusing since, according to the 
DOD, HSI is required to be implemented with the goal “to optimize total system 
performance and total ownership costs, while ensuring that the system is designed, 
operated, and maintained to effectively provide the user with the ability to complete their 
mission.”128 The instruction, however, does not spell out a specific definition for HSI. The 
HSI Requirements Pocket Guide refers to Air Force Instruction 63–1201—“Life Cycle 
Systems Engineering,” which defines “Human Systems Integration as a disciplined, 
unified, and interactive systems engineering approach to integrate human considerations 
into system development, design, and life cycle management to improve total system 
performance and reduce costs of ownership.”129  
HSI can be broken down into nine domains illustrated below in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. HSI Domains130 
This project focuses on the domain of Human Factors (HF) as the central concern 
of the team’s work with Autonodyne on their CCS for multiple Small Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (sUAV). According to the INCOSE Handbook, the Human Factors domain 
addresses how to incorporate human characteristics and limitations into systems design for 
optimal usability. Hardman spells out how the HF domain is commonly divided into four 
sections: 
• Cognitive— e.g., response times, level of autonomy, cognitive workload 
limitations 
• Physical—e.g., ergonomic control design, anthropomorphic 
accommodation, workload limitations 
                                                 
130Source: Nicholas S. Hardman, “An Empirical Methodology for Engineering Human Systems 
Integration” (PhD diss., Air Force Institute of Technology, 2009), 176, https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/2102/. 
   
 
55 
• Sensory— e.g., perceptual capabilities, such as sight, hearing or touch 
• Team dynamic—e.g., communication and delegation, task sharing, crew 
resource management131 
Overall, HF is centered around the creation of effective human/machine 
interactions. The four sections classify how the human user relates to, and is able to 
effectively utilize, the machine. Considering technological developments in artificial 
intelligence (AI) and machine learning that are core to sUAV, as well as improved 
automation and ever-increasing payload capabilities, it is critical to recognize the immense 
significance of the interaction of operators and sUAV. According to Hardman in his 
doctoral dissertation, “formal study of this has matured and expanded in perspective over 
the last three decades, and is now generally referred to as human-computer interaction 
(HCI).”132 Hardman goes on to offer a functional definition of HCI as “a field of study 
that seeks to improve the relations between users and computers by making computers 
more usable, intuitive, and accommodating of human capabilities and limitations.”133 
Properly accounting for the limitations and capabilities of a single operator, specifically at 
the tactical level where that individual is in a dynamic, foreign, and dangerous environment 
will reduce cognitive overload and, perhaps more importantly, improve adaptation and 
acceptance of the technology. Hardman asserts that the central emphasis of HCI is the 
“design of effective user interfaces (UIs); that is, the multi-modal exchanges between a 
human being and hardware; these interfaces facilitate interaction between human cognition 
and software logic.”134 Figure 7 is a pictorial depiction of human factors, HCI, and UI 
design and how they relate and build upon each other. 
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Figure 7. Human Factors Domain Components135 
To understand the importance of HCI, consider for argument’s sake that an operator 
can easily manage four sUAV in a static environment or even out on a mission that is 
relatively benign. What happens, however, when things become more dynamic from either 
a troops-in-contact situation, the deployment of an improvised explosive device (IED), or 
any number of potential dangers troops face during combat? If the operator cannot maintain 
situational awareness regarding the unfolding situation, simultaneously manage the sUAV, 
and becomes cognitively overloaded, a critical point is reached when training kicks in and 
tasks are prioritized in order of danger and/or criticalness. In aviation, the phrase used is 
“aviate – navigate – communicate.” This means when things start to go wrong an operator 
must focus on keeping the aircraft in the air, avoid flying into a mountain, and start 
communicating to support channels outside the aircraft. Thus, the operator would have to 
focus their attention on the task at hand while ignoring the management and control of the 
sUAV, rendering the devices useless. If an operator can’t control, manage, task, and receive 
critical information from the sUAV in a dynamic environment, then once the fog and 
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friction of war appear they are no longer in the fight. Therefore, UX and UI design that 
reduces cognitive load and lets the user maintain situational awareness is absolutely critical 
in the development of a CCS for sUAV.  
Having established principles and operational understanding of HSI, the HF 
domain, and HCI, we must now consider the specifics of User Experience (UX) and User 
Interface (UI). Maier argues the importance of both by stating, “The greatest leverage in 
system architecting is at the interfaces, and the greatest dangers are also at the 
interfaces.”136 The success of this critical node is often linked to the overall success or 
failure of the product and/or company, specifically in the private sector. There are lots of 
examples of this in the internet/technology sector such as BlackBerry failing to adapt to 
the competition by not developing touchscreen capability, MySpace overestimating user 
desire for full customization, and even Microsoft and the dreaded Windows 8 debacle of 
removing the “Start” button. Nicolas Hardman points out that while the impact of such 
fiascos in the commercial sector are on market share or profits, in the military they impact 
tactical advantage and could result in the loss of life, and the “Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook affirms this, identifying interface management, including the user interface, as 
a critical process that systems engineers must focus on.”137 Previous cost studies 
conducted by the DOD have concluded that the majority of total life-cycle costs are related 
to manpower, personnel and training.138 In The Importance of Designing Usable Systems, 
Susan Dray suggests a direct trade-off between manpower, personnel, and training costs 
and investment in the user interface; She cites a company project in which an “improved 
user interface on a large-scale internal application resulted in a 32% overall rate of return 
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stemming from a 35% reduction in training and a 30% reduction in supervisory time.”139 
This result dramatically illustrates the profound impact of user interfaces.  
The terms UX and UI are often used interchangeably, which can lead to some 
confusion, so it is important to define each concept independently and describe the manner 
in which they interact. Don Norman, a cognitive scientist, is credited with coining the term 
“user experience” in the late 1990s, which he describes as “encompassing all aspects of the 
end-user’s interaction with the company, its services, and its products.”140 UX, on the 
other hand, is a combination of the complete user experience while UI refers specifically 
to the actual product’s interface – in other words, what the user actually sees when they 
interact with the product. User Interface, put simply, is the point of human-computer 
interaction and communication on a device, webpage, app, or, in our specific application, 
Autonodyne’s graphical user interface (GUI) for their common control station. A simple, 
if crude, analogy would be that UI could be considered a person’s Tinder dating profile 
while the UX would be how the date they have with someone they connect with through 
the app goes. UI is often centered around functionality, while UX is much more of a 
psychological idea. For instance, the functionality might be just fine for a product, but if 
the UX is awful then it will be difficult to get the core users to adopt the product and 
continually utilize it.  
In the journal article Human–Systems Integration Verification Principles for 
Commercial Space Transportation, Guy André Boy states that, “User experience is linked 
to human factor issues and cognitive functions involved in the use of a system for executing 
a prescribed task in specific situations and environments.”141 Boy went on to explain that 
“human factors mainly include training (expertise), trust, risk of confusion, lack of 
knowledge (ease of forgetting what to do), workload, adhesion, and culture, while 
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cognitive functions include learning, situation awareness (that involves understanding, 
short-term memory, and anticipation), decision-making, and action (that involves 
anticipation and cross-checking).”142 This illustrates the importance of a holistic and 
comprehensive approach to user experience from training and documentation to 
complexity and ease of use for the intended user. For military technology designed to be 
utilized on the battlefield this means specifically the user experience under those conditions 
and not, for instance, when casually using the system on a test range.  
In the next section we will examine ten guidelines for user interface design and 
provide examples of how they can be applied specifically to Autonodyne’s CCS in a 
military context. Jakob Nielsen, a renowned web usability consultant, established a list of 
ten user interface design guidelines in the 1990s; these guidelines are referred to as 
heuristics because they are broad rules of thumb and not specific usability 
recommendations.143The ten heuristics were first presented by Nielsen at the Special 
Interest Group on Computer–Human Interaction (SIGCHI) Conference on human factors 
in 1994. Nielsen’s heuristics are listed below and after each heuristic exactly how they can 
be applied in the context of sUAV are: 
• Visibility of system status: The system should always keep users 
informed about what is going on through appropriate feedback within 
reasonable time. 
As drone swarms increase in complexity, system status reports should be limited to 
addressing only catastrophic failures. Also, multi-modal responses should be  explored to 
enable greater flexibility and prevent the user from having to see a  visual of a system 
status update.  
• Match between system and the real world: Designers should endeavor 
to mirror the language and concepts users would find in the real world 
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based on who their target users are. Presenting information in logical order 
and piggybacking on a user’s expectations derived from their real-world 
experiences will reduce cognitive strain and make systems easier to use.  
Maintaining normal military jargon, brevity, and code words can reduce cognitive 
strain and training. Terms made up by engineers to describe functions are often different 
than how troops are trained, which can lead to confusion.  
• User control and freedom: Offer users a digital space where backward 
steps are possible, including undoing and redoing previous actions.  
Mistakes happen, and during the fog and friction of war it is imperative to have an 
ability to abort a command even if it is not related to a kinetic strike.  
• Consistency and standards: Interface designers should ensure that both 
the graphical elements and terminology are maintained across similar 
platforms. For example, an icon that represents one category or concept 
should not represent a different concept when used on a different screen.  
This is extremely important since the CCS will be able to control several different 
types of drones from different manufacturers. Icons and commands should be the  same, 
and the software should be intelligent enough to not display commands that a particular 
drone with its given payload is not capable of executing.  
• Error prevention: Even better than good error messages, a careful design 
which prevents a problem from occurring in the first place is tantamount 
to ease of operation. Either eliminate error-prone conditions or check for 
them and present users with a confirmation option before they commit to 
the action. 
Intuitive user interface and smart software can help prevent user errors from 
occurring. In a dynamic environment on the battlefield troubleshooting error messages will 
be extremely difficult for an operator to manage. 
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• Recognition rather than recall: Minimize the user’s memory load by 
making objects, actions, and options visible. The user should not have to 
remember information from one part of the dialogue to another. Due to the 
limitations of short-term memory, designers should ensure users can 
simply employ recognition instead of recalling information across parts of 
the dialogue. Recognizing something is always easier than recall because 
recognition involves perceiving cues that help us reach into our deep 
memory and retrieve relevant information.  
During combat, often the operator will be juggling multiple tasks at once making 
recognition a critical component to limit cognitive overload. For example, using common 
military color schemes to indicate friendly or enemy positions and using  normal 
military symbols for different units help with operator recognition.  
• Flexibility and efficiency of use: With increased use comes the demand 
for fewer interactions to allow for faster navigation. This can be achieved 
by using abbreviations, function keys, hidden commands, and macro 
facilities. Users should be able to customize or tailor the interface to suit 
their needs so that frequent actions can be achieved through more 
convenient means.  
This can aid in two ways: allowing system setup and display based on user 
expertise, and providing an ability to scale the complexity of displays when a user starts to 
become over-tasked. In the future, a responsive UI based on biometric  monitoring 
could make these adjustments automatically based on predetermined biometric data points. 
For example, as a user becomes more stressed as determined  through active 
biometric monitoring, the UI automatically declutters the heads-up  display (HUD) to 
remove distractions from the operator. 
• Aesthetic and minimalist design. Dialogues should not contain 
information which is irrelevant or rarely needed. Every extra unit of 
information in a dialogue competes with the relevant units of information 
and diminishes their relative visibility. 
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Combat removes the luxury of the unnecessary. Only the relevant or critical is 
 required. 
• Help users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors. Error 
messages should be expressed in plain language (no codes), precisely 
indicate the problem, and constructively suggest a solution. 
Operators will have little time, or ability, to troubleshoot error messages in combat. 
 Therefore, the manner in which error messages are categorized and ultimately 
 displayed to the operator is critical. If an error can’t be fixed and degrades the sUAV 
 to the point it has lost its utility, then a simple notification of a loss is sufficient. 
 However, details on what happened are an example of unnecessary communication 
 to the operator. 
• Help and documentation: Even though it is better if the system can be 
used without documentation, it may be necessary to provide help and 
documentation. Any such information should be easy to search for, 
focused on the user’s task, list concrete steps to be carried out, and not be 
too large.144 
The majority of the time this will only be used in training or during a static, 
 relatively safe position, however, it should still be simple and easy to reference. 
Future program development can benefit from utilizing Jakob Nielsen’s ten 
heuristics for user interfaces. These will ultimately ensure great UI for a dynamic 
environment and a UX that enables organizational adoption of the technology. The 
performance of the humans in the system is built on the foundation of human systems 
integration in system development as portrayed in Figure 8.145 
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Figure 8. The Domains of Human Systems Integration146 
As illustrated above the domains of Human Systems Integrations ultimately build 
the foundation of human performance. All the building blocks of the pyramid are related. 
For example, the field of human–computer interaction has the potential to increase the trade 
space for the total system requirements –meaning that increased interface reduces demand 
on manpower, personnel, and training requirements, while a lower error rate improves 
efficiency, which reduces task execution times.147 As this analysis has shown, it is critical 
that HSI be initiated at the beginning of development and involves subject matter experts 
(SMEs) throughout the development process in order to realize the maximum benefits to 
the final product and reduce life cycle cost by avoiding continual refinement due to poor 
human integration. As the DOD looks to innovate and bring advanced technology to the 
battlefield, the adoption and incorporation for the warfighter will rely heavily on successful 
user experience design. 
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APPENDIX E. SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEM 
Jon R. Lindsay of the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy defines 
military organizations as systems of interdependent people, practices, and machines.148 
The relation between these elements is dependent on systems and processes that are defined 
and refined over time in reaction to advancements in technology. From moving troops on 
horseback to enabling operators to manage autonomous swarms, technical capacity is 
consistently informing the manner in which people and practices are utilized and 
empowered. As a fundamental element of the military, it is helpful to examine in detail 
how the nature of sociotechnical systems impacts the HEO system and USSOCOM’s 
progress toward autonomous systems.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
When Lord Wilfred Banks Duncan Brown became managing director of London’s 
Glacier Metal Company in 1939, the company was in a precarious financial position. 
Glacier had been fabricating plain bearings for engines since the turn of century, but in 
1938 it was embroiled in a patent infringement lawsuit that nearly put the company out of 
business, only being granted a brief reprieve during World War II to keep infringing on the 
patent in the name of national security.149 Perhaps understanding he had nothing to lose, 
Brown was emboldened to reshape the company’s operational approach based on a theory 
he described as “the necessity of encouraging everybody to accept the maximum amount 
of personal responsibility, and allowing them to have a say in every problem in which they 
can help”.150 In practice, this meant joint consultation between workers and management, 
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bringing employees into the decision-making processes to build trust, and encouraging 
employee responsibility.151  
B. RESEARCH ORIGINS 
Once the war ended, Parliament commissioned a panel to study the Glacier process, 
enlisting the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations led by the Canadian psychologist Dr. 
Elliott Jaques. He went on to publish his findings in a series of books starting with The 
Changing Culture of a Factory in 1951 which examined the workplace as a social system 
focused on technical functions, leading Jaques to postulate the relation between these 
elements required a new field of inquiry.152  
Another landmark study involving coal miners identified how social technical 
systems find workers who organize into autonomous teams and develop group-based 
strategies to overcome technical challenges and the differentiation and interdependence of 
tasks.153 Over the next 20 years, the Tavistock Institute was at the forefront of research 
into socio-technical systems, with co-founder Eric Trist establishing the first graduate 
program in sociotechnical theory at UCLA in 1966.154 Sociotechnical system theory 
proposes that people, as the constituent components of an organization, generate products 
or provide services using technology, with people impacting the function and 
appropriateness of the technology that is used, and technology influencing the actions and 
attitudes of the people using it.155 Sociotechnical theory finds that effective jobs and 
workflows are those that consider this interaction of technical and human needs by 
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balancing the people’s intrinsic needs with the organization’s need for technical 
efficiency.156  
C. TECHNOLOGY AND BEHAVIORS 
The design of an organization constrains the social systems functioning within it by 
defining the types and quality of behaviors needed for the organization to operate; the level 
of control, challenge, or feedback available to people, for example, results from the 
ordering and design of the technology.157 Based on a review of 134 sociotechnical 
experiments conduct during the 1970s, Pasmore, Francis, Haldeman, and Shani identified 
four orders of effects technology has upon organizations. Starting with the most direct 
effects on productivity, place, motions, and behaviors in the center, the model they created 
(Figure 9)158 moves outwards towards orders that emerge from the preceding layer with 
second order effects such as roles and relationships developing in order to coordinate 
actions and goals related to the direct effects. Adaptability, learning and other growth and 
sustaining skills emerge in the third order in relation to how people feel they are treated or 
valued by the organization, and in the final order, the technological patterns that define the 
organization impact its relationship with other organizations and society at large.159 
D. EVOLUTION OF SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS  
As human-computer interaction has become a pervasive aspect of work and life, 
the sociotechnical approach has provided a lens through which to view the intersection of 
technology and people in information systems and cognitive systems; it also has provided 
insight into the ways computers shape and define daily life and influence the manner in 
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which computer systems are used.160 The importance of understanding the human 
behavior and interaction models with sociotechnical systems spawned ergonomics and 
human factors research, research which aims to apply this understanding to interaction 
design in real-world settings.161  
In considering real-world sociotechnical interactions, there is an effort to establish 
a taxonomy of these interactions in order to limit unintended consequences and to develop  
Figure 9. The Impact of Technology on Behavior 
new approaches to human and computer interaction in a host of contexts.162 For instance, 
applying this approach to a simple interaction with an ATM, we find taxonomic categories 
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like output nature, which defines the acceptable precision of the machine reading the card; 
if the machine fails to read the card the first time it is inserted, it can lead to a state change 
in the user, such as memory lapses when typing in their PIN, a situation which occurs 
frequently.163 Even in this discreet element of a common activity, we can see the direct 
effects on human behavior and the nature of complexity in sociotechnical systems. 
E. SYSTEM PRINCIPLES 
The sociotechnical systems approach builds on general systems theory that is 
common to each scientific discipline, specifically the nature of interdependency and 
interrelation in cohesive, connected structures. Early on, Trist organized the system into 
three levels: the primary work system level, whole organization systems level, and 
macrosocial level.164 On the primary work level Trist defined seven principles of work 
design: 1) optimum variety of tasks, 2) meaningful pattern of tasks, 3) optimum length of 
work cycle, 4) scope for setting quality and quantity standards and feedback of knowledge 
of results, 5) inclusion of auxiliary and preparatory tasks, 6) inclusion of care, skill, 
knowledge or effort worthy of respect in the community, and 7) contribution to the utility 
of the product to the customer.165 Trist also developed new paradigms for a whole 
organization system which called for: joint optimization, workers as complimentary to the 
machine, workers as resources to be developed, optimum task grouping, internal controls, 
and a flat organization chart that allows for broad participation, collaboration, commitment, 
and innovation.  
Trist set the table for sociotechnical system to evolve into a broader societal 
context. Observing the rise of computing in business and anticipating its ability to impact 
society, he formulated a macrosocial approach that recognized systems larger than the 
single organization and proposed looking at sociotechnical systems on a domain level that 
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cut across whole industries.166 Trist also identified community-based sociotechnical 
endeavors, such as labor and management working together to reverse economic decline 
in communities.  
F. HISTORY AND USES 
From its inception, sociotechnical research has combined methods and subject 
matter expertise in psychology, sociology, and anthropology with engineering, 
mathematics, and business. Increasingly, sociotechnical system thinking involves 
computer science, human factors engineering, user experience design and similar 
disciplines. This pattern follows its evolution from an initial focus on production and 
manufacturing, where the goal was to humanize industries like coal, petrochemicals, and 
textiles, to its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, when it became increasing focused on the 
integration of computers into industry and business processes.  
By the beginning of the 21st century, principles of sociotechnical system theory had 
permeated design methodologies such as participatory design, design which often places 
users into system developer roles and empathic and contextual design which has developers 
adopting the user’s perspective.167 
G. JOINT OPTIMIZATION 
In order for work systems to operate effectively, the products or services they 
provide and the social and psychological impacts on people must generate positive 
outcomes and effects. When a sociotechnical system reaches this point of output 
equilibrium, it is said to be jointly optimized. Joint optimization recognizes the essential 
interrelatedness of the social, technical, and environmental components to the point that 
they cannot be separated; if these system components are addressed in isolation, each other 
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component is affected, leading to potential unforeseen consequences from performance 
degradation to complete system failure.168  
Figure 10 conceptualizes this relationship to illustrate that if any of the three 
components is moved independent of the others, the center zone of the Venn diagram is 
reduced. The dynamic nature of these relationships makes systemic adjusts complex, so 
core principles of joint optimization, informed by Trist’s principles, should be considered 
at all times. First, individual stakeholders need to have responsible autonomy; second, 
tasks, schedules, and processes should be adaptable, such that they can be adjusted by team 
members for optimization; third, tasks must be meaningful throughout the cycle of 
operations; and finally, there must be feedback loops based on recursive interactions.169  
H. JOINT OPTIMIZATION TAXONOMY  
Rhodes and Ross proposed a five-aspect taxonomy to analyze system performance 
for optimization and for classification of research: “structural related to the form of system 
components and interrelationships, behavioral related to performance, operations, and 
reactions, contextual related to the circumstances the system exists within, temporal related 
to the properties and dimensions of systems over time, perceptual related to stakeholder 
preferences, perceptions, and biases.” 170 Structural and behavioral aspects are further 
clarified as fundamental to the state of research practice, which is widely applied to systems 
architecture and design and systems engineering. Contextual, temporal, and perceptual 
aspects are more cutting-edge aspects of optimization that are being applied to new 
methods for modeling system relations such as epoch modeling and analysis in neural 
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networks, and Deep AI, multi-stakeholder negotiations, and complex data set 
visualizations.171  
 
Figure 10. Joint Optimization Diagram 
Applying the five aspect taxonomy to the optimization components reveals 
correspondence in each domain and provides a model for examination of granular aspects 
of the system for optimization. In the People/Social component, structural aspects are 
adaptable roles and self-managing teams, behavior aspects include ethics and 
collaboration, contextual aspects are politics, history, and culture, temporal aspects might 
be evolution of social norms, while perceptual aspects might be human cognition and 
biases.172 In the Technical / Environmental domain, structural aspects include modular 
design of technical systems and sustainable design practices, behavioral aspects 
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interoperability and sustainable practices, contextual aspects include technical platforms 
and industry or market paradigms, temporal aspects include requirement changes and 
resource depletion, and perceptual aspects include cognitive systems.173  
I. RISK ASSESSMENT 
Critical industrial, technical, and public health and safety functions require 
sociotechnical systems, so evaluating the reliability of such systems is crucial.174 Problem 
analysis and risk assessment of sociotechnical systems focuses on human error as related 
to human-machine interactions as well as interactions between humans; human error is the 
main cause of accidents, the implications of which can often be catastrophic and lead to 
system failure.175 Theories for understanding and evaluating the causes and consequences 
of accidents have evolved from Heinrich’s domino theory, that asserts accidents result from 
chains of events,176 and James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model, which posits that barriers 
in systems intended to prevent errors all have weaknesses or holes.177 Other systems 
thinking-based theories assert that accidents are the result of interactions between multiple 
human and technical elements such as functional resonance method (FRAM) and systems-
theoretic accident model and process.178  
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J. BROKEN LINKS APPROACH 
More recently, case studies involving the British Royal Navy have tested an 
approach known as Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST) to capture risk 
throughout the entire system, rather that examine constituent parts.179 The EAST approach 
examines systems in relation to social, task, and information networks with sociometric 
data used to identify key nodes, each of which has complex safety management roles and 
behaviors; a holistic social-task-information diagram is created and the relations between 
nodes are described as links.180 Broken links indicate communication breakdowns and 
information transfer failures and are used to predict possible risks in sociotechnical 
systems. Research also indicates that cultural differences, such as conflict avoidance or 
conflict resolution or collectivist or individualistic cultures, can lead to team errors in 
sociotechnical systems, especially in high pressure situations.181  
K. FUTURE TRENDS 
The technology-saturated state of the world finds cities transformed into smart 
urban ecosystems and the Internet of Things powering so much of daily life. These two 
examples reveal the complexity and reach of sociotechnical systems and reveal new 
opportunities and challenges that require a sociotechnical design approach. Three 
fundamental properties must be articulated in the context of these systems: the mutual 
constitution of people and technologies, the contextual embeddedness of this mutuality, 
and the importance of collective action.182The system must be examined from each of 
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these perspectives to identify the design problems as well as the roles, responsibilities, and 
requirements of all stakeholders. Ultimately, a collaborative design process is required that 
balances the needs of the community and the power of the technology, which is the essence 
of the sociotechnical system approach.  
L. CONCLUSION 
As sociotechnical systems, the AISUM concept and HEO can be better 
implemented by understanding the nature of such systems, the challenges they face, and 
the opportunities for optimization. By applying the principles of joint optimization that 
recognize that the social aspects of the operator, the specific powers of the technology, and 
the interaction with environment and context are intricately linked, we establish a rationale 
for design that considers how each aspect is affected by changes to the others. By 
emphasizing the impact of human factors we ensure that technical changes are not made 
without closely examining how they impact the end users. Sociotechnical system thinking 
provides logical structure to leverage the advancements in Artificial Intelligence and 
Machine Learning required for revolutionizing human-machine teaming while ensuring 
that usability in social context of military operations and individual operational capacities 
are central to our definition of success. 
  
   
 
76 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
   
 
77 
APPENDIX F. INNOVATION ADOPTION  
In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in April, 2017, 
Defense Innovation Board (DIB) chairman Dr. Eric Schmidt stated, “DOD does not have 
an innovation problem; it has an innovation adoption problem.” 183 Citing the size and 
complexity of the DOD’s mission and systems, Schmidt noted that friction and latency has 
been built into the Department’s decision-making process, adding additional layers of 
required coordination, rules, regulations and other mechanisms that inherently hinder the 
pace of change and growth.184 This resistance to innovation is not unique to the DOD and 
is it indicative of structural patterns that can be observed throughout culture and commerce. 
To better understand these challenges in the context of the HEO and AISUM writ large, it 
is instructive to examine the socio-technical concepts that underpin the adoption of 
innovation.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Popular opinion holds that 19th century American essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson 
said, “Build a better mousetrap, and the world will beat a path to your door,” evincing the 
notion that innovation improves the quality of life and is rewarded with success. True to 
form, this very quote appears to be an innovation on what Emerson actually wrote in his 
journal in 1855, the more verbose statement being, “I trust a good deal to common fame, 
as we all must. If a man has good corn, or wood, or boards, or pigs, to sell, or can make 
better chairs or knives, crucibles, or church organs, than anybody else, you will find a 
broad, hard-beaten road to his house, though it be in the woods.”185 In addition to making 
it pithier and easier to remember, the innovated version of the Emerson quote actually 
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mentions a mousetrap, a widely used cliché that captures a common sentiment. The quote 
is a successful example of innovation adoption. 
B. INNOVATION DIFFUSION 
In his book Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers defines an innovation as “an idea, 
practice, or project that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoptions” 
and explains that adoption occurs when full use of the innovation is “the best course of 
action available;” he goes on to posit that the idea spreads through diffusion, which is “the 
process in which an innovation is communicated thorough certain channels over time 
among the members of a social system.”186  
Diffusion of innovations requires four main components: the innovation, 
communication channels, time, and a social system. An innovation need not be new, in 
fact, it can be something that was invented a long time, but if people perceive that it is new, 
it is innovative to them.187 The newness might be expressed in knowledge, persuasion, or 
the user’s decision to adopt the innovation.188 Communication channels are the means by 
which a message is transmitted from individual to the next; time has multiple roles in 
diffusion, but one of the most important is the relative earliness or lateness of adoption 
with a social system or a set of interrelated units engaged in joint problem solving towards 
a common goal.189  
C. LEVELS OF USE 
To better understand individual variation in adoption of an innovation, Gene Hall 
and colleagues defined eight levels of use of an innovation, or distinct states characterized 
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by different user behavior, as part of the Concerns-Based Adoption Model (CBAM).190 
Hall et al. claimed each level is defined by seven categories of behavior --knowledge, 
acquiring information, sharing, assessing, planning, status reporting, and performing—that 
reveal the user’s trajectory from having a simple awareness of the innovation to collecting 
data, disseminating information to others, determining potential use, and performing.191 
The eight levels of innovation use are: non-use, orientation, preparation, mechanical use, 
routine, refinement, integration, and renewal with a key decision made by the user that 
triggers progression from one stage to the next.  
D. CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
A range of models have been developed to better understand technological and 
process innovation in different sectors including organizational management, consumer 
goods, and social groups.  
E. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS 
Innovativeness within organizations is related to independent variables on the 
individual and collective levels, including the characteristics of leaders in the organization, 
characteristics of the internal structure, and external characteristics of the organization192 
In Roger’s Diffusion of Innovation model, the leader’s attitudes towards change is more 
significant than in other approaches; internal characteristics of the organization structure 
factor highly, such as centralization, complexity, formalization, interconnectedness, 
organizational slack, and size while external characteristics of the organization are 
expressed in terms of system openness.193 Roger’s model as applied to information 
                                                 
190 Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 10–31. 
191 Gene E. Hall, Susan F. Loucks, William L. Rutherford, and Beulah W. Newlove, “Levels of Use 
of The Innovation: A Framework for Analyzing Innovation Adoption,” Journal of Teacher Education 26, 
no. 1 (1975): 52–56. 
192 Sahin, “Detailed Review of Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations Theory and Educational 
Technology-Related Studies Based on Rogers’ Theory.” 14–23. 
193 Fariborz Damanpour and Marguerite Schneider, “Phases of the Adoption of Innovation in 
Organizations: Effects of Environment, Organization and Top Managers,” British journal of Management 
17, no. 3 (2006): 215–236. 
   
 
80 
technology adoption has been used to study software acquisition, intranet, website 
implementation, and e-business. Other models consider the organization’s financial health 
as a key influencer on adoption, with greater financial health positively impacting 
adoption.194 
F. CONSUMER MODELS 
Consumer adoption of new technology is a major economic driver, with nearly half 
of all commercialized products failing in the marketplace, and a history of technical 
superior products losing out to competing ones.195 Historically, managers have relied on 
market research of consumer attitudes toward an innovation, and their intention to 
purchase, but research has found consumer attitudes toward adoption don’t correspond to 
actual adoption; consumers indicate the intention to adopt more complex innovations that 
better match their needs, however, consumers actually adopt innovations that are less 
complex but have higher relative advantages.7  
G. SOCIAL MODELS  
Innovation adoption in social and political contexts tends to manifest as campaigns 
to change public behavior, such as antismoking initiatives or campaigns to stop drunk 
driving. Some interesting factors determine which social innovations are adopted and 
which fail. Researchers examined an elementary school program to provide students with 
a fluoride-based dental rinse in an effort to reduce cavities, but districts, by and large, failed 
to adopt it. This was not because they had the carefully weighed the pros (reduced cavities) 
and cons (potential health impacts of fluoride), but because they made no decision at all.196 
                                                 
194 Vittorio Chiesa and Federico Frattini, “Commercializing Technological Innovation: Learning from 
Failures in High‐Tech Markets,” Journal of Product Innovation Management 28, no. 4 (2011): 437–454. 
195 Joep Arts, Ruud T. Frambach, and Tammo HA Bijmolt, “Generalizations on Consumer Innovation 
Adoption: A Meta-Analysis on Drivers of Intention and Behavior,” International Journal of Research in 
Marketing 28, no. 2 (2011): 134–144. 
196 Mary Ann Scheirer, “The Life Cycle of an Innovation: Adoption Versus Discontinuation of the 
Fluoride Mouth Rinse Program in Schools.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior (1990): 203–215. 




Another approach to determining the intentions behind user behavior is a cognitive 
learning model. While behavioral models consider observable behaviors in response to 
external stimuli, cognitive learning models look at the degree of problem solving a user 
undertakes in response to stimuli.197 Cognitive models factor in six internal beliefs that 
shape user attitudes towards adoption: perceived difficulty, adoptive experiences, 
perceived commitment, perceived benefits, compatibility, and enhanced value.198 One 
example is the Technology Acceptance Model, which holds that computer technology 
acceptance is informed by perceptions of usefulness and ease of use, as well as individual 
affects.199 
I. SOCIAL DIFFUSION  
Social cognitive theory is based on an agentic perspective 200 asserting that people 
are proactive, self-organizing, self-regulating, and self-reflecting and not just reactive 
parties , and that our self-development and adaptation are rooted in social systems.201 The 
Social Cognitive Theory of Mass Communication emphasizes modelling’s effects on the 
adoption of innovation; modelling behaviors use the power of demonstration and 
description to instruct people on new ways of behaving and thinking.202 Modelling the 
benefits of an innovation enhances individual self-efficacy and motivates as it informs, 
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accelerating the diffusion of innovation through social channels by weakening the restraints 
of more cautious potential users once they see the how the innovation benefits early 
adopters.203  
Much of the theoretical discussion on adoption models suggests a pro-change bias 
that makes the assumption that consumers are fundamentally open to change and therefore 
more interested in adopting new products.204 Increasingly though, research reveals that 
consumers often reject innovations out of hand before considering their potential benefits. 
To overcome this pro-change bias, some theorist differentiate passive resistance to 
innovation from active resistance to innovation, with the former based on consumers being 
generally predisposed to resist change or be skeptical of innovative claims, and the latter 
reflecting a hardening of attitudes in reaction to negative reviews or evaluations of an 
innovation.205  
User resistance to change and bias towards the status quo has been found to be the 
leading barrier to large scale information technology innovation adoption in 
organizations.206 Similarly, certain consumers continued to resist using Internet banking 
well past the point that it became established and a successful innovation; reasons for 
resistance included security and privacy concerns, but some customers also perceived that 
online banking had not demonstrated enough advantages over using the ATM which more 
customers were familiar with.207 
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This begs the question: why is it a problem if some users prefer ATMs over online 
banking, since there is still a unique need for both? The points of resistance can themselves 
be drivers of new innovation. For instance, consumers who once resisted online banking 
using their PC at home might more readily adapt to using a banking app on their mobile 
phone, perhaps because they perceive it as more secure or simply that it actually 
demonstrates the appropriate advantages they need from a banking innovation, and they 
finally found the better mousetrap they were looking for.  
In the context of HEO and AISUM, the ability to leverage the technology across 
the broader USSOCOM enterprise increases value and necessity of adopting the 
innovation. As Dr. Schmidt points out in his House testimony, “in an organization as large 
as DOD, good ideas that cannot scale would seem to have limited utility.” 208 This echoes 
Davidson and colleagues’ findings that design of the HEO system has been informed by 
the need to provide logistics, sustainment, and transportation support missions sets ranging 
from counter-terrorism, covert operations, and direct action to hostage rescue, high-value 
target hunting, intelligence operations, and unconventional warfare across the entire 
combatant command.209 This versatility also presents new opportunities for support from 
leaders in a variety of competencies, and in keeping with Roger’s model, strong leadership 
around an innovation can drive adoption. It is the goal of this capstone project to provide 
the data and applied findings that leaders in USSOCOM can use to champion HEO system 
development while emphasizing strong human machine interfaces and robust operator 
support in order to achieve broad adoption. 
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